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I. INTRODUCTION
Surely Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. gave federal Indian law no thought
when he wrote that "experience" -including "[t]he felt necessities of the
time" and "even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-
men" -- contributes more "than the syllogism" to the development of
judge-made law.' Nor was federal Indian law on his mind when he
contrasted an "ideal system of law" based on "science" with the one he
inhabited, in which "tradition, or vague sentiment" produced doctrines that
were "accidental relics of early notions." 2 Yet his aphoristic analysis
strikingly resonates with both sides in a key dispute of federal Indian law-
whether a tribe may regulate all persons within the historical boundary of
its reservation-that has produced both incoherent Supreme Court
precedents and incandescent controversies in the lives of the people subject
to them. Consider an example.
Located in rural South Dakota, the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation
may seem far removed from the great legal controversies of our day. Yet, in
less than a decade, it was the setting for two important cases concerning
contemporary tribal authority. In the first, Solein v. Bartlett,3 the Supreme
Court held that reservation borders specified in a nineteenth-century treaty
survived the later enactment of a federal statute that opened the reservation
for non-Indian homesteading and that has resulted in a significant non-
Indian population there. The Court concluded:
When both [the statute] and its legislative history fail to provide
substantial and compelling evidence of a congressional intention to
diminish Indian lands, we are bound by our traditional solicitude
for the Indian tribes to rule that diminishment did not take place
and that the old reservation boundaries survived the opening.4
As a result, the tribe has potentially significant authority over non-
Indian reservation landowners.' At least some of these non-Indians feel
betrayed. In their view, Solem ignored their reasonable expectations and
those of their predecessors that non-Indian lands were outside the
reservation. They complain of being subject to a sovereign in which they
have no say, a sort of "taxation without representation" foreign to
1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLiES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 1 (Boston. Little. Brown & Co.
1881).
2. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., Learning and Science, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS
138, 139 (1920).
3. 465 U.S. 463 (1984).
4. Id at 472.
5. See City of Timber Lake v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 10 F.3d 554 (8th Cir. 1993)
(upholding tribal regulation of non-Indian liquor transactions).
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America.6 They could invoke Holmes to contend that "tradition, or vague
sentiment" -what the Court in Solem called its "traditional solicitude for
the Indian tribes" -has produced an "accidental relic" of tribal sovereignty
inconsistent both with longstanding congressional and private expectations
and with fundamental fairness.
In the second case, South Dakota v. Bourland,7 the Court held that the
tribe could not regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing in an area where
Congress had taken reservation land to build a dam, reservoir, and public
recreation area. Even though the land remained within reservation
boundaries, the Court concluded that, "when Congress has broadly opened
up such land to non-Indians, the effect of the transfer is the destruction of
preexisting Indian rights to regulatory control." 8
Bourland and Solem fit together awkwardly in both law and life.
Doctrinally, the focus in Bourland on the effect of the congressional
alienation of Indian land seems inconsistent with Solem, where the
reservation remained intact despite the congressional alienation of Indian
land because no clear congressional intent to diminish tribal authority had
been shown. As a practical matter, Bourland probably antagonizes tribal
members as much as Solem angers non-Indian reservation residents.
Because of Bourland, the tribe lacks integrated regulatory authority over its
territory. Tribal leaders, too, could invoke Holmes in contending that tribal
sovereignty, long recognized by the Supreme Court, was displaced by a
one-sided perception of non-Indian "felt necessities" to be free from tribal
authority that are rooted in the "prejudices which judges share with their
fellow-men [and women]."
The controversy at Cheyenne River is contemporary federal Indian law
in microcosm. What the Supreme Court said long ago remains true today:
The relation of Indian tribes to the broader American system "has always
been an anomalous one and of a complex character."9 The Constitution
does not clearly delineate the relationship among tribes, the federal
government, and the states.'0 It is unsurprising, then, that the task of
rationalizing the field has largely fallen to the Supreme Court. Given the
6. A non-Indian resident of the Cheyenne River Reservation put it as follows:
They [the tribe] have no right to tell me what to do-I'm not Indian!... If this were
Indian land, it would make sense. But we're a non-Indian town. There is no Indian land
here. This is all homestead land, and the tribe was paid for it. I already pay taxes to the
State of South Dakota. The tribe doesn't provide us with any services. There's no tribal
law enforcement here. I can't vote in tribal elections or on anything else that happens
on the reservation. What they're talking about is taxation without representation.
FERGUS M. BORDEWICH, KILLING THE WHITE MAN'S INDIAN 97 (1996).
7. 508 U.S. 679 (1993).
8. Id. at 692.
9. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381 (1886).
10. The Constitution mentions Indians only three times. Congress may regulate commerce
"with the Indian Tribes," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and "Indians not taxed" are not counted
when apportioning the House of Representatives, id § 2, cl. 3; id. amend. XIV, § 2.
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lack of guidance in positive law, the complexity of the issues, and the
tangled normative questions surrounding the colonial displacement of
indigenous peoples to construct a constitutional democracy, it is also not
surprising that the resulting decisional law is as incoherent as it is
complicated.'
As the Cheyenne River cases indicate, one of the most vexing clusters
of questions involves the geographical extent of reservations containing
many non-Indians and the authority of tribes to regulate nonmembers found
in "Indian country." 2 Over the past four decades, the Supreme Court has
decided six cases concerning reservation boundaries in addition to Solem.'3
Although the cases purport to follow Solem's injunction that only clear
congressional intent may work a reduction in reservation size, Part II
demonstrates that their results cannot be squared with that standard. As Part
IV documents, over the same period the Court has decided the remarkable
number of fourteen cases involving tribal criminal, civil, and judicial
authority over nonmembers found on reservations. 4 Tribes prevailed in two
seemingly easy cases-considering whether Congress could authorize tribal
civil regulation of nonmembers' 5 and whether a tribe could tax the sale of a
product to a nonmember' 6-- as well as in three more controversial settings. 7
11. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents: Coherence and
Conciliation in Federal Indian Law, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1754 (1997).
12. A federal criminal statute defines "Indian country" as
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the
United States government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including
rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities
within the borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently
acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all
Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including
rights-of-way running through the same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994). The Supreme Court has borrowed this definition for civil cases as well.
See DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975).
13. See South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 118 S. Ct. 789 (1998); Hagen v. Utah, 510
U.S. 399 (1994); Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977); DeCoreau, 420 U.S. 425;
Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973); Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
14. See El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 119 S. Ct. 1430 (1999); Strate v. A-I
Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997); South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993); Duro v. Reina,
495 U.S. 676 (1990); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation. 492
U.S. 408 (1989); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987); National Farmers Union Ins.
Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985); Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195
(1985); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982); Montana v. United States, 450
U.S. 544 (1981); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation. 447 U.S. 134
(1980); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); United States v. Mazurie, 419
U.S. 544 (1975); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
15. See Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544; infra text accompanying notes 148-162.
16. See Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134; infra text accompanying notes 240-243.
17. Williams held that an action brought by a nonmember against a member to collect on a
debt incurred in Indian country must be heard in tribal court. For a discussion of Williams. see
infra text accompanying notes 133-147. Kerr-McGee and Merrion upheld tribal power to impose
a severance tax upon a non-Indian company extracting minerals from tribal land. For discussion of
Merrion, see infra text accompanying notes 244-250; for a discussion of Kerr-McGee. see infra
note 248.
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Three other cases reached peculiar compromises." The other six decisions
diminished the tribal capacity to deal with nonmembers who fail to comply
with reservation law. Are these opinions defeats for legitimate tribal
authority, a kind of ongoing judicial colonization in Indian country? Or do
they reflect a proper respect for the civil rights of American citizens who,
because they cannot participate in tribal government or serve on tribal juries
and are not members of the ethnic group exercising sovereign authority,
lack the actual and virtual representation that provides the customary
nonjudicial protection from governmental abuse in the United States? 9
Moreover, whatever might be the appropriate normative conclusions about
these decisions, do they fit together into a conceptual whole or disaggregate
into incoherence?
This Article examines the concept of tribal sovereignty that was
originally developed by the Supreme Court and that has evolved as the
result of clashes with the interests of nonmembers. Part II traces the
traditional model of tribal authority, which at least implicitly assumed that
tribes have geographical sovereignty over their reservations and all persons
found there. In recent years, the Supreme Court has undercut this
understanding in two fundamental ways. As Part III demonstrates, the Court
has sometimes reduced tribal geographical sovereignty by diminishing
reservation boundaries to free largely non-Indian areas from tribal control.
As Part IV documents, the Court has also substantially undermined tribal
authority even within acknowledged reservation borders by concluding that
tribes have no criminal, and only limited civil, jurisdiction over
nonmembers found there.2"
On the surface, the analysis in Parts III and IV seems to reveal an
incoherence between the outcomes of these decisions and their purported
doctrinal underpinnings. Part V suggests, however, that an unstated
18. The Court reached an odd 4-2-3 split in the Brendale case, with the outcomes on the
issues controlled by the two-Justice swing faction. See infra text accompanying notes 222-230. In
National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. and Iowa Mutual, the Court appeared to create a
presumption favoring tribal-court jurisdiction over civil cases brought by a tribal member against
a nonmember on a cause of action arising in Indian country. In Strate, however, a case arising on
non-Indian land, the Court deviated from that approach and understood the earlier cases as simply
sometimes requiring such a nonmember defendant to exhaust tribal-court remedies before seeking
federal judicial relief against the tribal-court action. See infra text accompanying notes 254-277.
For a discussion of Neztsosie, the most recent decision on tribal-court jurisdiction, see infra note
277.
19. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REvIEW 77-101 (1980) (arguing that the Federal Constitution assumes a process of representative
government that presumptively provides adequate actual and virtual representation of citizens).
20. For an earlier recognition of these strategies, see Robert Laurence, The Dominant
Society's Judicial Reluctance To Allow Tribal Civil Law To Apply to Non-Indians: Reservation
Diminishment, Modem Demography and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 781
(1996) [hereinafter Laurence, Judicial Reluctance]; and Robert Laurence, The Unseemly Nature of
Reservation Diminishment by Judicial, as Opposed to Legislative, Fiat and the Ironic Role of the
Indian Civil Rights Act in Limiting Both, 71 N.D. L. REv. 393 (1995).
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assumption underlies all of them: Tribal sovereignty over non-Indian areas
and tribal authority to regulate significant nonmember interests are
inconsistent with what the Supreme Court presumes to be the wishes of
Congress. Because in these cases the congressional intent is unstated,
however, the outcomes turn on judicial presumptions, rather than legislative
resolutions, concerning the question whether tribes are sovereigns or merely
membership organizations. Thus, it is the Court, not Congress, that has
exercised front-line responsibility for the vast erosion of tribal sovereignty.
The coherence that underlies the doctrinal confusion in the cases is a strong,
albeit largely unarticulated and undefended, judicial aversion to basic
claims of tribal authority over nonmembers that is implicitly projected upon
Congress as well.
That the Court has exercised this extraordinary authority in an area in
which Congress has long operated with plenary power' supports the
disturbing conclusion that the Court has assumed a legislative function-
that of implementing the ongoing colonial process. 2 Part V suggests that
the Court has done so by flattening federal Indian law into the broader
American public law by importing general constitutional and
subconstitutional values into the field. The Court has undertaken this task
without congressional guidance. A half-millennium after the colonial
process began, in our time of great skepticism concerning colonization,'
our least democratic branch has become our most enthusiastic colonial
agent.
The primary purpose of this Article is to engage in a wide-ranging and
open-minded exploration of the contemporary Supreme Court's
consideration of tribal sovereignty. I have attempted to be generous to the
Court in searching for descriptive coherence and normative support for its
work, even when that leads to conclusions inconsistent with my views
supporting tribal sovereignty. In doing so, I articulate a variety of possible
coherentist interpretations of the decisional law. This speculative and polite
search for coherence should not be confused with either doctrinal reality or
normative attractiveness. Indeed, as I shall explain, my speculations not
only have descriptive problems associated with them-they are often in
great tension with precedent and broader legal principles-but they are
rooted as well in a normatively unattractive judicial colonial impulse
beneath the dignity of the best qualities of federal Indian law. Ultimately, I
21. See infra text accompanying notes 48-53.
22. For earlier commentary critical of the Court in this respect. see Philip P. Frickey.
Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal
Indian Law, 107 HARv. L. REV. 381, 422-26, 432-39 (1993); and David H. Getches, Conquering
the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L
REV. 1573, 1575 (1996).
23. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law. 81 MiNN. L REv. 31, 76
& n.177 (1996) (summarizing the decolonization movement in the international community).
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conclude that the law remains muddled in many respects. What I identify is
more an unreflective judicial trend rooted in apparent uneasiness with tribal
authority than a paradigmatic, entrenched doctrinal shift. Especially
because the Court has paid little attention to the tension between
longstanding principles of federal Indian law and the contemporary judicial
drift away from them, there remains room for future elaborations ratifying
meaningful tribal authority. Nonetheless, my account raises significant
questions concerning whether the contemporary Court is likely to embrace
an approach to federal Indian law that is both doctrinally coherent and
normatively defensible. Accordingly, Part VI considers the roles that other
actors might play in circumventing this judicial trend.
II. THE BASIC MODEL OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
A. Foundational Premises
Questions concerning tribal power are, of course, not new. In his
monumental attempt to systematize federal Indian law, Felix Cohen
addressed the place of tribal power within the American scheme of
governance.24 Cohen concluded that "[t]he whole course of judicial
decision"' 2 adhered to three basic principles. First, prior to European
contact, a tribe possessed "all the powers of any sovereign state." 6 Second,
the European colonial process, which Cohen labeled "[c]onquest,"
renders the tribe subject to the legislative power of the United
States and, in substance, terminates the external powers of
sovereignty of the tribe, e.g., its power to enter into treaties with
foreign nations, but does not by itself affect the internal sovereignty
of the tribe, i.e., its powers of local self-government.27
Third, tribes therefore retain internal sovereignty "subject to qualification
by treaties and by express legislation of Congress."28 Thus, tribal powers
generally are not "delegated powers granted by express acts of Congress,"
but instead are "inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never
been extinguished." 29  Consistently with established canons of
24. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1941). On Cohen's
jurisprudence in general and in federal Indian law in particular, see Stephen M. Feldman, Felix S.
Cohen and His Jurisprudence: Reflections on Federal Indian Law, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 479 (1986).
Probably his most famous jurisprudential writing is Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and
the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935).
25. COHEN, supra note 24, at 123.
26. Id.
27. Id. (footnote omitted).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 122 (emphasis omitted).
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interpretation,' ambiguities in federal statutes that might be read as
invading tribal authority are construed narrowly to protect tribal interests.3 '
Similarly, provisions of Indian treaties that might undercut tribal authority
are also read narrowly, based on two key assumptions: The treaty
transaction was a cession of rights by the tribe rather than a granting of
rights by the United States,3 - and these cessions, along with all other treaty
provisions, are to be interpreted as the Indians would have understood
them.33
Cohen's synthesis was rooted in two eras of Supreme Court
decisionmaking. 4 In the early nineteenth century, the Marshall Court
developed most of the foundational principles of federal Indian law in a trio
of cases. In Johnson v. McIntosh,35 Chief Justice Marshall's opinion for the
Court concluded that, upon "discovery" by Europeans, tribes lost their
status as complete sovereigns and, in particular, their ability to engage in
external relations with any sovereign other than the European discovering
country.36 Marshall then explained, in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia," that
30. For modem examinations, see Frickey, supra note 22; and Charles F. Wilkinson & John
M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "'As Long as Water Flows, or Grass
Grows upon the Earth "-How Long a Time Is That?, 63 CAL. L. REV. 601 (1975).
31. See COHEN, supra note 24, at 122.
32. See id
33. See id at 37. Taken together, these concepts require an inquiry into whether the Indians
understood that they were ceding away a particular interest, rather than whether the United States
understood that it was granting that interest to the tribe or whether the language of the treaty
provided any seemingly objective answer to this question.
34. By this I do not mean that Cohen's treatise presented some objective, detached synthesis
of easily derived principles. Because federal Indian law is notoriously incoherent, it has been
especially subject to conceptual molding. As Felix Frankfurter wrote in honor of Cohen's treatise,
"Only a ripe and imaginative scholar with a synthesizing faculty would have brought luminous
order out of such a mish-mash." Felix Frankfurter, Foreword to Felix S. Cohen. Dialogue on
Private Property, 9 Rt'GERs L. REV. 355, 356 (1954). Indeed, Cohen forthrightly acknowledged
the normative spirit animating his work:
What has made this work possible, in the final analysis, is a set of beliefs that form the
intellectual equipment of a generation-a belief that our treatment of the Indian in the
past is not something of which a democracy can be proud, a belief that the protection of
minority rights and the substitution of reason and agreement for force and dictation
represent a contribution to civilization, a belief that confusion and ignorance in fields of
law are allies of despotism, a belief that it is the duty of the Government to aid
oppressed groups in the understanding and appreciation of their legal rights, a belief
that understanding of the law, in Indian fields as elsewhere, requires more than textual
exegesis, requires appreciation of history and understanding of economic, political.
social, and moral problems.
COHEN, supra note 24, at xviii. Nonetheless, as Harold Ickes wrote in his foreword to the
Handbook, "Whatever legal force [the Handbook] will have must be derived from the original
authorities which have been assiduously gathered and patiently analyzed." Harold L Ickes.
Foreword to id. at v, vi. As the discussion in the text indicates, the basic principles that I have
taken from Cohen had significant precedential grounding.
35. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
36. In Johnson, Marshall stated that a tribe was locked into an exclusive sovereign-to-
sovereign relationship with the discovering European country, such that it could engage in treaty
relations and land transactions only with the representatives of that country. See id. at 573.
37. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
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although tribes had no sovereignty in an international sense, they retained
some governmental authority within the United States.38 Marshall labeled
the tribes "domestic dependent nations '' 39 in a relationship with the United
States that "resembles that of a ward to his guardian." 4 Finally, in
Worcester v. Georgia4 '-the most important decision in federal Indian
law-Marshall concluded that, because the federal-tribal relationship was
exclusive, states had no role in Indian country. Marshall analogized the
relationship between tribes and the United States to that between a weaker
sovereign and a stronger, supporting sovereign under international law.4 To
be sure, a tribe could cede away power or property by treaty, but Marshall
adopted canons of interpretation that require clarity before courts may
conclude that a tribe has in fact given up valuable rights. 3 Absent any clear
treaty cession or congressional act, a tribe retained territorial sovereignty
over its reservation."
At the end of the nineteenth century, the Court made it even clearer that
tribal authority is generally inherent and retained. Talton v. Mayes45 held
that the Constitution did not apply to the grand jury indictment process
adopted by the Cherokee Nation to prosecute its members in tribal court.
The police powers of the tribe were not "Federal powers created by and
springing from the Constitution, 46 but rather "existed prior to the
Constitution" 47 and amounted to retained, inherent sovereignty free from
38. Marshall stated that "[s]o much of the argument as was intended to prove the character of
the Cherokees as a state, as a distinct political society, separated from others, capable of managing
its own affairs and governing itself, has, in the opinion of a majority of the judges, been
completely successful." Id. at 16. In Cherokee Nation, Marshall wrote for only one other Justice
(McLean); two other Justices (Thompson and Story) concluded in dissent that the tribe was a
foreign state, and the other two Justices participating (Johnson and Baldwin) thought that it
possessed no sovereignty at all. Marshall's opinion was, therefore, something of a middle ground,
and it is relied upon today despite its lack of complete precedential value. See, e.g., Alaska v.
Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 118 S. Ct. 948, 954 n.5 (1998); Oklahoma Tax Comn'n
v. Citizens Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505,509 (1991).
39. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
40. Id.
41. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
42. See id. at 561.
43. Marshall understood the treaty transaction to be a ceding of rights by the tribe, not a
granting of rights by the United States, with the key question being what the Indians thought they
were giving up. See id. at 552-53. He also assumed that the purpose of the treaty was to promote
peace rather than to "annihilat[e] the political existence of one of the parties," and stated that the
contrary conclusion could be supported only by "openly avowed" treaty language. Id. at 554. On
Marshall's interpretive strategies, see Frickey, supra note 22, at 384-417.
44. Marshall wrote:
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own territory, with
boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and
which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the
Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of congress.
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561.
45. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
46. Id. at 382.
47. Id. at 384.
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federal constitutional constraint. Taken together, Worcester and Talton
constitute the conceptual high-water mark of tribal sovereignty in federal
Indian law and, as Parts Ill and IV indicate, remain formidable precedents
antagonistic to modem judicial efforts to undercut tribal authority.
At the turn of the century, the Court also clarified the final element of
Cohen's three principles concerning tribal sovereignty: the role of
congressional authority to diminish tribal power. In Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock,4 the Court concluded that Congress had "[p]lenary authority
over the tribal relations of the Indians," 4 9 a power that the Court deemed "a
political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the
government."5 Although the implication that exercises of congressional
power over Indian affairs are nonjusticiable political questions has not
survived more recent cases,5 the Court continues to refer to the "plenary
power" of Congress over Indian affairs.Y Indeed, the Court has never
invalidated a federal statute on the ground that it invaded tribal authority."
In addition to being rooted in precedent, Cohen's three principles
represented a normative accommodation of our colonial heritage and a
judicial respect for tribal survival as a self-governing authority. The
principles accept the inevitable: The United States resulted from a colonial
process that cannot be undone at this late date, no matter the normative
concerns that might be raised about it. Thus, in light of "the actual state of
things,"'  courts viewed themselves as impotent to consider basic
challenges to historical colonization, such as the involuntary loss of tribal
authority to engage in government relations and land transactions with any
entity other than the United States and the presumed supremacy of
Congress over Indian affairs. Moreover, tribes themselves had ceded away
other important interests on a treaty-by-treaty basis. Despite these factors,
48. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
49. Id at565.
50. Id.; see also United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 34 (1913) (holding that Congress's
plenary power extends even to Indians who are citizens and who hold property in fee simple);
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 380 (1886) (holding that Congress may criminalize even
purely intratribal misconduct on the reservation).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980); Delaware Tribal
Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977).
52. See, e.g., Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989).
53. The most recent case striking down a federal statute involving Indian affairs, Babbitt v.
Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997), and three earlier cases, Hodel v. Irving. 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912), and Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. I (1899). involved
interference with individual Indian property rights. Cf Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371
(upholding an award of just compensation for the taking of the Black Hills). Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), invalidated a statutory provision on Eleventh Amendment grounds.
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911). invalidated a statute because it called upon courts
to issue advisory opinions.
54. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 591 (1823).
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however, and in the face of the historical justifications for colonization,5
the Supreme Court had assumed that the relationship between the
colonizers and the tribes was benign, one of trust and cooperation rather
than of annihilation. 6 Thus, treaties were viewed as solemn agreements
between cooperative sovereigns under which the tribe, not the federal
government, granted rights, which as in derogation of their own sovereignty
should be narrowly construed. So, too, although Congress had the authority
to destroy Indian rights, the assumption was that Congress would not do so
lightly, and thus canons of interpretation protecting tribal interests were
applied to statutory as well as treaty interpretation."
These principles combine to form an institutionally sensitive approach
to the ongoing American colonial process-the centuries-old but continuing
series of conflicts between indigenous peoples and those elements of the
dominant society seeking to displace their institutions and prerogatives. 8
Under the canons of interpretation, positive law on the books (treaties,
statutes, and so on) is construed narrowly to preserve tribal sovereignty
against all but crystal-clear losses. This technique forces opponents of tribal
power to bear the heavier burden in litigation-they must marshal the
complexities of the case persuasively-and leaves the reviewing court a
simple way to cut through the confusions of federal Indian law. If, as
should often occur, tribal authority survives this challenge, its opponents
then must bear the burden of legislative inertia. Although Congress may
change the outcome, it may do so only openly, by clear statutory language
that should flag the issue for legislators and lobbyists who favor Indian
interests and that should ensure a fairer legislative fight. Because it is much
easier to kill legislation than to enact it,59 tribal interests have significant
advantages in the legislative struggle. Thus, the courts place significant side
constraints on the imposition of new colonial intrusions while leaving the
55. In Johnson, Marshall acknowledged several such justifications-civilizing and
Christianizing the Indians, see id. at 573, and promoting economic progress by authorizing
"agriculturalists, merchants and manufacturers... to expel hunters from the territory they
possess," id. at 588-but refused to become embroiled in the controversy over whether these
rationales could justify colonization, see id. at 589.
56. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 546-47 (1832) (asserting that the
European discovering countries did not generally interfere with internal tribal matters and
obtained Indian lands and political allegiances by purchase, not by coercion); see also id. at 554
(stating that an Indian treaty represented a sovereign-to-sovereign peace agreement, not an act
"annihilating the political existence of one of the parties").
57. See, e.g., Choate, 224 U.S. at 675-76, 678.
58. Here I borrow from my earlier commentary. See Frickey, supra note 22, at 416, 428-32.
438; see also Getches, supra note 22, at 1573-74, 1581-93, 1652-55 (describing and urging the
retention of" foundation principles" of federal Indian law).
59. See, e.g., KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 314-15, 395-96, 398 (1986).
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ongoing issues of the relationship of tribes and the larger society in the
hands of Congress.'
B. The Fragility of These Principles in the Context of Non-Indians in
Indian Country
Under these principles, tribes possess all authority not lost as a result of
original European contact, explicit treaty cessions, or unambiguous
unilateral congressional action. Accordingly, absent treaty or statutory
language to the contrary, non-Indians found on an Indian reservation would
seem to be subject to tribal authority. Moreover, all three of these categories
have significant limiting principles that further undercut any non-Indian
immunity to tribal regulation.
As defined by the Marshall Court, the first category concerns the loss of
authority to have government relations and land transactions with any entity
other than the "discovering" European sovereign or its successor, the
United States. It reflects the essential premises necessary to rationalize
colonization from its outset and to promote the efficient displacement of
indigenous interests on an ongoing basis. Under these assumptions, the
colonial process is bilateral, involving subordinated tribes locked into an
exclusive relationship with the dominant United States. The non-Indian side
of the process is centralized in Congress, which is empowered to carry out
the colonization of the continent. Thus, when a diminished tribal authority
is traceable to this category, the reason is that the tribal power in question is
inconsistent with the capacity of Congress to engage in efficient
colonization. The rights of private individuals-such as non-Indians found
in Indian country-are, accordingly, irrelevant.
Johnson v. McIntosh,6 the case establishing this category, makes this
clear. Johnson held that, when a tribe allegedly transferred land to a non-
Indian without the consent of the United States, and thus in violation of
basic colonial assumptions, the putative purchaser received no rights
cognizable in American courts.62 Instead, the Court concluded that the tribe
had validly conveyed the Indian title when it later transferred the land to the
United States.63 The best that the Court could do for the successors to the
alleged first purchaser was to suggest that they approach the tribe and seek
any relief available under tribal law.64 Thus, Johnson indicates that, in the
60. For my take on the limits on the supposed plenary power of Congress over Indian affairs,
see Frickey, supra note 23. For a thorough overview of these issues, see Nell Jessup Newton,
Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L REv. 195 (1984).
61. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
62. See id. at 587-89.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 593.
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absence of federal protection rooted in treaty or statute, non-Indians who
enter Indian country must take tribal law as they find it.
65
The other two categories of diminished tribal authority are, at least in
theory, substantially confined as well. As mentioned above, the canons of
interpretation require a clear statement in a treaty or statute before tribal
interests are deemed lost. As described earlier, 6 the Court's opinion in
Solem refusing to find a diminishment of the boundaries of the Cheyenne
River Sioux Reservation demonstrates both the outcome-determinative
potential of these canons and their survival into modem-day jurisprudence.
When these three categories are examined together, then, it would seem
inescapable that tribes retain territorial sovereignty over their reservations
unless some federal treaty or statute has plainly abrogated it. Absent clear
immunity in such positive law, non-Indians who find themselves on an
Indian reservation would seem to be subject to the authority of the tribe,
just as they would be subject to the authority of New York when strolling
across Central Park. That is not how the law has turned out, however. As
Part III demonstrates, the canons have lost much of their bite in the context
of tribal regulation of nonmembers. As Part IV documents, the Court has
also undermined tribal sovereignty by reopening the category of tribal
powers that are inconsistent with domestic dependent status and then
evaluating nonmember complaints about assertions of tribal authority on a
case-by-case basis.
At least two factors explain the fragility of the principles that seemingly
mandate tribal geographical sovereignty. First, they were developed in
cases contesting the authority of tribes vis-A-vis the federal or state
governments or the tribe's own members, not vis-A-vis non-Indians. The
conclusion that tribes have authority to regulate non-Indians found on
reservations follows logically from these cases, but was not at issue in any
of them. The second, related factor is that these understandings were
developed against the backdrop of a simple context, in which Indian
reservations were perceived to be enclaves for Indians only. Congress
shattered that understanding when it adopted the General Allotment Act of
1887,67 a policy directive that reservations be divided up into allotments for
tribal members, with the land left over opened to non-Indian homesteading.
Implemented on a tribe-by-tribe basis, the allotment process was designed
to assimilate Indians into the larger society. 68 The allotments were to be
65. For helpful interpretations of Johnson along these lines, see Milner S. Ball, Constitution.
Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 3, 23-29; and J. Youngblood Henderson,
Unraveling the Riddle of Aboriginal Title, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 75, 93-96 (1977).
66. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4.
67. Dawes General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (1994)).
68. For an overview of the allotment process and its contemporary consequences. see Judith
V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1995). My conclusions in Parts III-V.
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held in trust for a period of time, rendering them inalienable and free from
state taxation and providing an opportunity for the allottees to learn western
agricultural ways. The theory was that, when the trust period ended and the
land was transformed into fee simple status, the Indian owners would be
assimilated into the agricultural economy. Reservations would disappear
over time, and the "Indian problem" would be solved.
It never turned out that way. Allotment was a disastrous policy. When
the allotments became alienable, sometimes much more quickly than
originally planned, huge amounts of Indian land were lost through sales and
tax foreclosures.69 By the 1920s, it had become clear that allotment was a
failure. 0 In the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, Congress embraced this
reality, extending the trust period for all remaining allotments in perpetuity
and providing that no further allotments be made.7' Congress did not
attempt to undo the effects of allotment, however.7
Federal Indian law has not been the same since the allotment era.
Because of allotment, many reservations today have a significant non-
Indian population and a checkerboard land pattern with non-Indian fee
property mixed in with Indian allotments and collective tribal property.
Indeed, the demographic diversity in Indian country today is remarkable. At
one extreme, over ninety-six percent of the residents of the Navajo
reservation are Indian.73 At the other extreme, the Port Madison Reservation
of the Suquamish Indian Tribe in Washington contained over 2900 non-
Indians and only fifty members at the time the tribe engaged in major
litigation concerning its authority to regulate nonmembers.'
linking the Court's abandonment of undiluted principles of tribal sovereignty to the presence of
non-Indians in Indian country as the result of the allotment process, are consistent with those of
Royster, supra, at 70-78, and Getches, supra note 22, at 1622-26, as well as those that I articulated
in an earlier article, see Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent. Practical Reasoning, and the
Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1137, 1150. 1180-81 (1990).
69. See, e.g., FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 138 (R. Strickland et
al. eds., 1982).
70. See INSTrruTE FOR GOV'T RESEARCH, BROOKINGS INST.. THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN
ADMINISTRATION 7, 460-62,470-72 (Johnson Reprint Corp. 1971) (1928).
71. See Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994)).
72. The Court addressed this matter in County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of
the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992):
Except by authorizing reacquisition of allotted lands in trust, however, Congress made
no attempt to undo the dramatic effects of the allotment years on the ownership of
former Indian lands. It neither imposed restraints on the ability of Indian allottees to
alienate or encumber their fee-patented lands nor impaired the rights of those
non-Indians who had acquired title to over two-thirds of the Indian lands allotted ....
Id. at 255.
73. See L. Scott Gould, The Congressional Response to Duro v. Reina- Compromising
Sovereignty and the Constitution, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 53, 137 tbl.5 (1994).
74. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 193 n.l (1978). For a discussion
of this case, see infra text accompanying notes 163-193. For a quick overview of the demographic
diversity in Indian country, see Gould, supra note 73, at 129 tbl.3.
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During the allotment era, another factor also undermined the simple
"we/they" context of federal Indian policy. In 1924, Congress unilaterally
conferred citizenship upon Indians who had not yet attained that status."
Like it or not, Indians were now citizens of both the United States and their
state of residence as well as members of their tribes.
These developments substantially complicate any analysis of
contemporary federal Indian law. Where it was once plausible to imagine
that the only important relationship in the field was a bilateral one between
Congress and the tribes, the interests of individuals-Indian and non-Indian
alike-are now salient by virtue of the congressional policies of allotment
and Indian citizenship. Nonetheless, the federal policy of promoting tribal
sovereignty was restored in 1934 and remains in place today. 6 How might
one rationalize this more complex context? To return to Holmes's
aphoristic analysis: Which is today's "accidental relic," the presence of
nonmembers on reservations long after the abandonment of allotment, or
the continuation of tribal sovereignty itself? Can federal judges adjudicate
disputes in this controversial environment by following the "felt necessities
of the time" without falling victim to "shared prejudices" ?
It is probably not surprising that, in this more muddled context, courts
have sometimes limited tribal authority over nonmembers. Two basic
strategies have emerged. As Solem indicates, one method is to reexamine
the location of reservation boundaries in order to free largely non-Indian
areas from tribal control. Because neither Congress's embrace of the
allotment policy nor its subsequent abandonment of it explicitly dealt with
the question of reservation boundaries, Congress created a conundrum of
treaty and statutory interpretation concerning the limits of reservations. Part
III examines how, despite the canons of interpretation, the contemporary
Supreme Court has sometimes interpreted century-old allotment statutes as
diminishing reservation size. A second avenue for truncating tribal
authority is to conclude, as Bourland did, that nonmembers are immune
from tribal power even if found on a reservation. As Part IV explains, the
disruptive impact of allotment has led to a contemporary reevaluation of
which tribal powers are inconsistent with current domestic dependent
status.
75. See Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253.
76. For a brief overview, see Frickey, supra note 68, at 1138 & n.7, 1178-79 & nn.225-26.
President Clinton has aggressively reaffirmed the principle of tribal sovereignty. See Consultation
and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, Exec. Order No. 13,084, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,655
(1998); Government-to-Government Relations with Native American Tribal Governments:
Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,951 (1994).
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III. DIVESTING TRIBAL TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY BY
REDUCING THE TERRITORY
The allotment policy produced the enduring presence of non-Indians in
Indian country, the transfer of significant portions of formerly Indian land
to non-Indians, and substantial conflict over reservation boundaries. Justice
Marshall's opinion for the unanimous Court in Solem is the most honest
attempt to understand what allotment was and what it produced.
Unfortunately, by the time Solem was decided the Court had embraced an
approach that is incompatible with candor.
In Solem, Justice Marshall began by noting that the allotment statutes
"seldom detail whether opened lands retained reservation status or were
divested of all Indian interests." 77 This distinction was unimportant at the
time of enactment because Congress understood reservation status and
tribal ownership to be synonymous and assumed that allotment would
rapidly assimilate Indians into the broader society, causing "the reservation
system [to] cease to exist."" "Given this expectation, Congress naturally
failed to be meticulous in clarifying whether a particular piece of legislation
formally sliced a certain parcel of land off one reservation." ' Years later,
after the allotment process was abandoned, Congress "uncouple[d]
reservation status from Indian ownership" so by defining "Indian country"
to encompass all reservation lands, including that owned by non-Indians."'
Note precisely what Marshall posited: The statutes did not address
reservation boundaries, and Congress did not deliberate about them. A
straightforward application of the principle that statutes diminish Indian
interests only when Congress has spoken clearlyv- would, therefore, compel
the conclusion that reservation boundaries remained intact in every instance
fairly covered by Marshall's historical generalizations-which would
presumably include every allotment statute. The only way out of this
conclusion would seem to be to abandon the clear-statement canon and
privilege some other source of legal determinacy. One potential technique
would be to fall back upon the original congressional purposes associated
with allotment, which of course was designed to destroy the reservation
system. Interpreting the statutes in light of their original purposes would
produce the converse conclusion that the reservation was diminished in
every instance fairly covered by Marshall's generalizations-again,
presumably in every case. Yet in Solem Marshall squarely rejected any




81. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994)); see also supra note 12 (quoting this statute).
82. See supra text accompanying note 57.
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categorical resolution of these controversies by such purposive
interpretation.83 Instead, consistent with the canonical method, he wrote that
Congress must "clearly evince an 'intent to change boundaries' before
diminishment will be found." '
This resort to established principle did not, however, produce the
categorical resolution of these controversies that logic would require. The
four cases on diminishment prior to Solem had reached disparate
outcomes-the first two had found no diminishment; 5 the other two, with
Marshall in dissent, had found diminishment.8 6 In attempting to follow
these precedents in Solem, Marshall undermined the conceptual clarity and
outcome-producing quality of the canonical approach by supplementing it
in three ways.
The first was to categorize the cases based on the precise statutory text
at issue in them. Marshall read the precedents as establishing what might
uncharitably be called a "magic language" approach to statutory
interpretation. In a case finding a diminishment, the statute stated that the
tribe agreed to "cede, sell, relinquish, and convey to the United States all
[the Indians'] claim, right, title and interest" 7 in unallotted lands in return
for a specified sum. In contrast, in a precedent finding no diminishment, the
statute directed the Secretary of the Interior "to sell or dispose of"
unallotted lands, with the tribe receiving whatever proceeds were
generated.8 Thus,
[e]xplicit reference to cession or other language evidencing the
present and total surrender of all tribal interests strongly suggests
that Congress meant to divest from the reservation all unallotted
opened lands.... When such language of cession is buttressed by
an unconditional commitment from Congress to compensate the
Indian tribe for its opened land, there is an almost insurmountable
83. According to Marshall:
Although the Congresses that passed the surplus land Acts anticipated the imminent
demise of the reservation and, in fact, passed the Acts partially to facilitate the process,
we have never been willing to extrapolate from this expectation a specific
congressional purpose of diminishing reservations with the passage of every surplus
land Act.
Salem, 465 U.S. at 468-69.
84. Id. at 470 (quoting Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 615 (1977)).
85. See Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973); Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351
(1962).
86. See Kneip, 430 U.S. 584; DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
Marshall wrote a dissent in Kneip, see 430 U.S. at 615, and joined Justice Douglas's dissent in
DeCoteau, see 420 U.S. at 460.
87. See Salem, 465 U.S. at 469 n.10 (discussing DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 439-40 n.22. 445).
88. See id. (discussing Seymour, 368 U.S. 351).
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presumption that Congress meant for the tribe's reservation to be
diminished. 9
It belabors the obvious to note that these conclusions cannot coincide
with the approach embraced by Marshall earlier in Solem. Focusing on
statutory text was disingenuous when he had already concluded that only
clear congressional intent could diminish Indian interests and that Congress
had not been meticulous in clarifying whether allotment affected
reservation borders. In any event, surely even a modest application of the
canon would treat "cede, sell, relinquish, and convey" for a specified
amount as ambiguous concerning whether the tribe had simply agreed to
convey land title or had also taken the extraordinary act of ceding away
whatever sovereignty it had then or might be recognized as having in the
future.
The second step Marshall took was to posit that, under the precedents,
circumstances surrounding an enactment may support a finding of
diminishment.' To be sure, such circumstances did serve as the basis for
the Court's inference of diminishment in a case where the statute arguably
lacked magic language.9' Inferences of diminishment, however, should not
count under the canonical approach. Relying upon them is perilously close
to adopting the purposive approach to interpreting allotment statutes that
would likely result in diminishment in all cases and that Marshall had
already rejected earlier in Solem.
Finally, Marshall read the cases as establishing that, "[t]o a lesser
extent.... events that occurred after the passage" of the statute should be
examined "to decipher Congress['s] intentions."9 The conceptual problem
with this approach, of course, is that postenactment developments reveal
nothing about original congressional intent, much less intent sufficiently
clear to satisfy the canon.93 The relevant postenactment factors turn out to
89. Id at 470-71.
90. See id. at 471 (mentioning the negotiations history, legislative history, federal and state
treatment of the area immediately following enactment, and demographics of the area soon after
allotment).
91. See id. at 469 n.10, 471 (explaining Kneip, 430 U.S. 584). The first in a series of statutes
concerning this reservation did contain "magic language," however. See Kneip, 430 U.S. at 591
n.8; cf. Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 427 (1994) (Blackmun. J., dissenting) (treating the Kneip
case as involving magic language).
92. Solem, 465 U.S. at 471.
93. Marshall wrote that "we look to the subsequent demographic history of opened lands as
one additional clue as to what Congress expected would happen once land on a particular
reservation was opened to non-Indian settlers." let at 471-72. If only Congress could be so
prescient in other areas in which it legislates! Marshall further explained: "Resort to subsequent
demographic history is, of course, an unorthodox and potentially unreliable method of statutory
interpretation. However, in the area of surplus land Acts, where various factors kept Congress
from focusing on the diminishment issue. ... the technique is a necessary expedient." Id. at 472
n.13. Under the canonical approach supposedly followed in Solem, however, no expedient is
needed, and the technique is irrelevant.
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be the demographics of the disputed area and its jurisdictional treatment by
the federal and state governments-whether the area had "lost its Indian
character" '94 and had fallen out of tribal control. Marshall noted "the
obvious practical advantages of acquiescing to de facto diminishment" :9'
Such areas are more easily administered by state and local authorities.96
Conversely, "a largely Indian opened area" outside a reservation results in
"imbalanced checkerboard jurisdiction" 97 because the Indian trust lands
remain under federal and tribal authority while neighboring non-Indian
lands are under state and local control.9
Postenactment developments, the least legally probative considerations
mentioned in Solem, turn out to be the most outcome-determinative factors
in the cases." The two cases before Solem that found diminishment
involved heavily non-Indian areas;'00 the other two cases, in which no
diminishment was found, contained no suggestion that the reservation had
lost its Indian character.'' Despite all of its agonizing efforts to render the
inquiry a matter of legal principle, Solem is consistent with this analysis. It
stressed that allotment "was a failure" "0 on Cheyenne River, that the
"population of the disputed area is now evenly divided between Indian and
non-Indian residents," 103 that "roughly two-thirds of the Tribe's enrolled
members live in the opened area," 104 and that the "seat of tribal government
is now located in a town in the opened area, where most important tribal
activities take place." 105 Accordingly, "it is impossible to say that the
opened areas of the [reservation] have lost their Indian character." "
Solem is a puzzle when viewed on its own terms, as a statutory
interpretation case involving a canon focusing on congressional intent.
When it and the prior diminishment cases are assessed through a wider lens,
however, it seems that the Supreme Court resolved each of them not by
94. Id. at 471.
95. Id.
96. See id. at 471 n.12.
97. Id.
98. "Indian country" includes all Indian trust allotments of land and all dependent Indian
communities, as well as all land within a reservation. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994), quoted supra
note 12.
99. See, for example, Laurence, Judicial Reluctance, supra note 20, at 789-90; and James M.
Grijalva et al., Diminishment of Indian Reservations: Legislative or Judicial Fiat?, 71 N.D. L.
REV. 415 (1995), especially the comments of Frank Pommersheim in Grijalva et al.. supra, at 422.
100. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 604-05 (1977) (noting that the state
had long exercised jurisdiction over the disputed area, which was over 90% non-Indian);
DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 428 (1975) (stating that the disputed area
contained "about 3,000 tribal members and 30,000 non-Indians" ).
101. See Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 505 (1973); Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S.
351, 356 (1962).
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statutory interpretation, but by practical, contextual judgments concerning
whether, because of postenactment developments, the disputed area had lost
its "Indian character." The judicial focus was on the current and the
concrete, not on the historical or the textual, the supposed importance of
"magic language" notwithstanding. In short, the Court implicitly embraced
a common-law-like approach that displaced statutory interpretation.
A decade after Solen was decided, Hagen v. Utah"7 returned the Court
to the now-familiar pattern of reservation allotment, non-Indian settlement,
and decades of jurisdictional confusion. The history of the statute in
question seemed to fit Justice Marshall's conclusion in Solem that Congress
did not consider reservation boundaries in opening the reservation. Nor did
the statute contain the "magic language" of cession of tribal interests
recognized in earlier cases. Accordingly, as the Solicitor General argued as
amicus curiae in support of the tribal position, the canonical approach
compelled the conclusion that the reservation had survived allotment
intact."" The opened area was eighty-five percent non-Indian, however."
Predictably, the press of current context overwhelmed the canonical
construct.
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion finding diminishment is
susceptible to both legalistic and realistic readings. Legalistically, her
approach was based on two premises. First, she rejected the Solicitor
General's canonical argument because the precedents "require[] us to
examine all the circumstances surrounding the opening of a reservation." "
Second-and inconsistently-she created a new category of magic
language that trumped all other potential sources of statutory meaning. She
held that the statutory text providing that "all the unallotted lands within
said reservation shall be restored to the public donzain" amounted to a
congressional directive that the lands had lost their Indian reservation
status."' Realistically, her opinion stressed current factors: the
overwhelming non-Indian demographics and the longstanding state
assertion of jurisdiction over the opened lands." 2 These considerations
"demonstrate [1 a practical acknowledgment that the Reservation was
diminished; a contrary conclusion would seriously disrupt the justifiable
expectations of the people living in the area." "
3




111. Id. As Justice Blackmun argued in dissent, however, the term -public domain" is
ambiguous and could easily be understood as simply making the lands in question available for
non-Indian purchase and settlement, not removing them from the reservation to boot. See id. at
427-30 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
112. Seeid.at421.
113. Id. (emphasis added).
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Hagen stands in stark contrast to Solem, which rejected reliance upon
general congressional assimilative purposes unadorned by explicit
congressional intent. The most coherent understanding of Hagen is that,
even in the absence of clear congressional intent, such a purpose does
control if through the passage of time it has achieved fruition in current
demographics, patterns of governance, and "justifiable expectations" of
non-Indians. The alternative, and more legalistic, understanding of Hagen,
which turns on an expandable category of magic language, is neither well
justified in Hagen nor easy to square with the most recent diminishment
case, which utterly deflates the importance of the text of positive law.
South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe"4 involved facts that seem more
like a law school examination question than a Supreme Court case. The
surplus lands agreement contained the magic language supposedly
indicating diminishment. Yet it also contained a seemingly bulletproof
savings clause providing that " [n]othing in this agreement shall be
construed to abrogate" the preexisting Indian treaty establishing the
reservation." 5 Of course, if the agreement diminished the reservation, it
unquestionably abrogated the provisions of the earlier treaty. Thus, the
Court seemed to have written itself into a corner in Yankton, for its "magic
language" approach to diminishment ran squarely into the literal language
of the savings clause. Presumably, even under a watered-down canonical
approach, such a square textual conflict should be resolved in favor of the
tribal position. Yet the demographics of the disputed area were, again,
heavily non-Indian," 6 and the state had exercised jurisdiction since the time
of allotment." 7 Should the Court simply abandon legalisms and capitulate
to its perception of the practical solution-deferring to the status quo of
non-Indian regional character, "reasonable" non-Indian expectations, and
state jurisdiction?
As in Hagen, the impression of a non-Indian status quo made the
outcome against the tribe in Yankton predictable, even if the legalistic
rationale was difficult to foresee."8 Indeed, with Justice Blackmun now
retired, no Justice even bothered to dissent from Justice O'Connor's
opinion in Yankton finding a diminishment.
Legalistically, as one would expect, Justice O'Connor relied upon the
presence of the magic language. The critical move in her opinion was then
to conclude that a "literal construction of the saving clause" would
114. 118 S. Ct. 789 (1998). For a strong critique of the decision, see Judith V. Royster, Of
Surplus Lands and Landfills: The Case of the Yankton Sioux, 43 S.D. L. REV. 283 (1998).
115. Yankton, 118 S. Ct. at 795 n. 1.
116. See id. at 804.
117. See id.
118. In answering a question posed in my fall 1996 examination on federal Indian law that
was based on this case, a number of my students predicted that the tribe would lose because of
"bad facts" but had difficulty articulating a legal theory to support that outcome.
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"impugn the entire sale." "9 In short, she reasoned that the magic language
created such a strong presumption of diminishment that the savings clause
could not be taken at face value. She did not consider the alternative
explanation: that the savings clause showed the folly of relying upon magic
language in the first place. Invoking the canon that courts should avoid
absurd results, she then narrowly interpreted the savings clause as
concerning only the continuation of the payment of annuities required by
the earlier treaty, and not the integrity of the treaty-defined reservation
borders.'20 In response to the canonical argument that, at a minimum, the
agreement was ambiguous and therefore should be interpreted to favor the
tribe, she simply dogmatically stuck to the position that, under the relevant
precedents, the presence of the magic language "plainly indicates
diminishment," and that the canonical method is not "a license to disregard
clear expressions of tribal and congressional intent." 121
Even aside from the canon, however, formidable principles of
interpretation stood in the way of privileging the magic language and
essentially writing the savings clause out of the agreement. The Court today
approaches statutory interpretation with an eye toward textual integrity r'2-
a "holistic endeavor" 123 that seeks to avoid the conclusion that any portion
of text is redundant or superfluous or should be read out of a statute.
Tellingly, the savings clause at issue in Yankton was apparently the
strongest version of any such clause found in an Indian treaty or
agreement.124 The contrast between it and the weaker clauses in other
treaties and agreements should have led the Court to give it its plain
meaning. The Court has engaged in this sort of "whole code"
harmonization approach in recent years." That it failed to undertake any
effort in this regard demonstrates the degree to which the text of positive
law and even the techniques of statutory interpretation lack explanatory
value in these cases, the invocation of "magic language" and canonical
method notwithstanding.
Realistically, the savings clause did not stand much of a chance of
surviving state assumption of jurisdiction and non-Indian demographic
dominance. That the Court felt comfortable deferring to its perception of
the status quo was indicated by its statement that "the area remains
119. Yankton, 118 S. Ct. at 799 (quoting State v. Greger, 559 N.W.2d 854. 863 (S.D. 1997)).
120. See id at 799-800.
121. Id. at 800-01 (quoting DeCoteau v. District County Court. 420 U.S. 425, 447 (1975)).
122. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Tertualism, 37 UCLA L REV. 621
(1990) (documenting the rise of the "new textualism," under which statutory interpretation is
determined by assessing the ordinary meaning and coherence of text).
123. United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988).
124. See Brief Amici Curiae of Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes
of the Fort Peck Reservation in Support of Respondent Yankton Sioux Tribe at 4-9, South Dakota
v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 118 S. Ct. 789 (1998) (No. 96-1581).
125. See, e.g., West Virginia Univ. Hosps. v. Casey. 499 U.S. 83. 100-01 (1991).
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'predominantly populated by non-Indians with only a few surviving pockets
of Indian allotments,' and those demographics signify a diminished
reservation." 126
Taken as a whole, the judicial method in the diminishment cases might
appear to be essentially lawless. To place a legalistic gloss on what
amounted to mere deference to the perceived status quo, the Court first
gave undue weight to language of cession and payment of a sum certain.
Next, in Solem, which involved an area that, to non-Indian eyes, had not
lost its Indian character, the Court unduly contrasted the legal impact of the
"magic language" with words-" sell and dispose of'-meaning about the
same thing. Throughout these cases, the Court maintained that it had not
abandoned the canonical method, in which only clear congressional intent
could result in diminishment. Yet, in Yankton, the most recent case, the
canonical method ended up completely impotent, lacking even sufficient
force to tip the scales in favor of the tribe when a square textual conflict
arose between recognized "magic language" and an impenetrable savings
clause. In totality, the cases suggest that, to adapt an old joke about
Congress, no Indian reservation is safe while the Supreme Court is in
session.
Perhaps it is unfair, however, to castigate the Court for these decisions.
After all, it was Congress that established the policy of allotment in order to
destroy reservations. Congress then abandoned the policy, but did nothing
to undo the damage already wrought by it. The Court is left in the unhappy
situation of having to clean up the mess, a century later, on a case-by-case
basis. The Court has, arguably, tried to reach practical resolutions of each
dispute, deferring to the demographics and settled jurisdictional patterns
that are present.
Indeed, what the Court has done might be defensible not just
practically, but jurisprudentially as well. In all these cases, no explicit
statutory text or clear legislative intent governs the diminishment question,
but a general congressional purpose is embedded in every allotment
statute-to destroy the reservation system and assimilate Indians into the
larger society. Under the common practices of statutory interpretation,
statutory purpose is the next best source of meaning where statutory text
and legislative intent are inconclusive.'27 In light of its "traditional
solicitude for the Indian tribes," however, as Justice Marshall explained in
126. Yankton, 118 S. Ct. at 804 (quoting Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463. 471 n.12 (1984))
(emphasis added).
127. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 345-62 (1990). Under the model of statutory interpretation
proposed in HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1374-80 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P1.
Frickey eds., 1994), the judicial attribution of purpose is the primary method of ascertaining
statutory meaning.
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Solem,t" the Court has not implemented this general congressional purpose
in every case. Where the regional character and settled jurisdictional
patterns provide practical support for treating the disputed area as Indian
country, the Court has done so. These are instances of dynamic statutory
interpretation, in which general legislative purpose is deflated in light of
subsequent circumstances unforeseen by the legislature.' -9 But where
current circumstances seem consistent with original general congressional
purpose, the Court has deferred to legislative supremacy by reaching the
assimilative result of diminishment.
This account is the best that I can muster in support of the
diminishment cases. Even under it, the Court scores poorly on any
evaluation of its candor. If I have portrayed accurately what the Court has
done, why it has done it, and how what it has done might be supportable
jurisprudentially, the Court should forthrightly abandon the fiction that the
cases are rooted in explicit congressional intent. It should admit that the
basic inquiry is whether century-old general congressional purpose has
reached fruition in the current context.
In the final analysis, however, having done the best I can to put a good
jurisprudential face on the Court's work, I still find it exceptionally
wanting. It ignores at least two important factors.
The first problem with the Court's work is that Congress has repudiated
the allotment policy. The Court has never explained why an obsolete
general congressional purpose lacking specific statutory text or clear
legislative intent purporting to bind future generations deserves respect
today. Moreover, by refusing to admit that it is implementing a general (and
repudiated) congressional purpose rather than explicit congressional intent,
the Court has sought to shift the blame for the erosion of tribal authority to
a century-old Congress rather than where it belongs-the current Court."'
Presumably, what is motivating the Court is not some jurisprudential
notion that it must implement obsolete statutory purpose, come what may.
Instead, the animating factor is surely the desire to protect what the Court in
Hagen called the "justifiable expectations" "' of the non-Indians now
128. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 472 (1984).
129. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE. JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
(1994).
130. The effort to pass the buck is illustrated by Yankton:
The allotment era has long since ended, and its guiding philosophy has been repudiated.
Tribal communities struggled but endured, preserved their cultural roots, and remained.
for the most part, near their historic lands. But despite the present-day understanding of
a "government-to-government relationship between the United States and each Indian
tribe," see, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 3601, we must give effect to Congress's intent in passing
the 1894 Act. Here, as in DeCoteau, we believe that Congress spoke clearly, and
although "[slome might wish fit] had spoken differently... we cannot remake
history."
118 S. Ct. at 805 (quoting DeCoteau v. District County Court. 420 U.S. 425. 449 (1975)).
131. Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 421 (1994).
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residing on reservations. In addition, presumably the Court believes that it
should try to allocate jurisdiction so that largely non-Indian areas are
subject to state, rather than tribal and federal, control. These are weighty
policy considerations, and it will not do for those who sympathize with
tribes to brush them off. The real culprit is not the non-Indians, but
Congress, which established the policy creating the incentives for non-
Indian settlement and then abandoned it, leaving the non-Indians high and
dry while doing little to undo the damage caused to tribal interests. There is
plenty of pain to go around in the historical and contemporary lessons of
allotment.
At a minimum, however, the Court has never sought to justify that it is
empowered to balance such hardships in the first place, much less to
identify what counts as hardship and what importance should be given to
each hardship. The Court seems to see these matters as one-sided, involving
unfairly put-upon non-Indians who suffer from potential regulation by an
archaic sovereign that continues to exist merely as one of Holmes's
accidents of history. The baseline assumption seems to be that state
jurisdiction over Indian and non-Indian alike is customary, fair, and
efficient, while tribal responsibility concerning non-Indians is bizarre,
unfair, and inefficiently overlapping with state authority. Why is non-Indian
autonomy privileged and tribal authority displaced-in the context of a
repudiated assimilationist policy and a current policy of promoting tribal
sovereignty? What is it about assimilation and state jurisdiction that strikes
the Court as coherent, and tribal autonomy and geographical sovereignty as
incoherent? Does the judicial instinct grow out of melting-pot notions of
"We the People," ignoring that "We" did not create our constitutional
democracy on uninhabited land, but rather placed our system on top of, and
ultimately displaced, preexisting "Peoples"? Under a broader perspective,
what is natural, neutral, and coherent may become quite confused.
The second problem with what the Court has done in the diminishment
cases is that, while claiming the contrary, it has veered away from the
canonical method of resolving federal Indian law disputes, a technique
rooted in over a century and a half of precedent. To be sure, the Court has
the authority to do this, but at a minimum it should discuss the problem
forthrightly. Why does the presence of a sufficient number of non-Indians
undermine the canonical method? Of course, that method was created in the
absence of significant non-Indian interests, and it may be appropriate to
reconsider it in light of the more complicated contemporary circumstances.
But a reading of these cases suggests not a careful current reevaluation, but
a casual, unreflective concession to non-Indian instincts-Holmes's "felt
necessities of the time," which may contain the seeds of "prejudices which
judges share with their fellow [citizens]." In any event, regardless of
[Vol. 109: 1
Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority
whether the Court's instincts merit the epithet "prejudice," it seems clear
with which of their fellow citizens the Justices share more empathy.
In the last analysis, then, it is not unfair to hold the Court responsible in
these cases. It is the Court, after all, that is exercising the critical choice of
preferring general, obsolete congressional purpose to the canonical method.
No positive law-nothing in the Constitution or federal statute-compels
the Court to embrace one approach or the other. In our written corpus of
law, it is the Court's own opinions that provide the most relevant text to
evaluate in making this choice. And the most longstanding, and most
thoughtful, of them support a canonical approach. 3"2 Of course, whichever
way the Court goes, Congress has the authority to alter the outcome. But
this allocation of first-line judicial case-by-case responsibility and second-
level discretionary legislative revisionary capacity just reaffirms the
common-law feel of this domain.
In conclusion, the Court has commissioned itself in these cases to
rework jurisdictional lines in federal Indian law using a methodology that
Holmes would have recognized as case-by-case common-lawmaking rooted
in "felt necessities." Unfortunately, the Court has not acknowledged the
pretense of its nod to statutory interpretation and the reality of its embrace
of common-law methodology to reach these results, much less defended its
movement away from the canonical scheme established in longstanding
precedent. Moreover, only in a circuitous way has the Court identified the
postenactment factors that seem to be driving these outcomes. Solem
embarrassingly admitted that these factors have little to do with statutory
interpretation, but no opinion carefully considers how they combine in a
defensible and predictable manner in the Court's broader common-law
methodology. One is left with the suspicion that a number of unarticulated
(and perhaps even unrecognized) values are at work. The elegant
formulation of Indian law principles has been displaced, in a more
culturally complicated context, by an ad hoc balancing test. Whether an
area is "Indian country" is no longer as much a question of law as it is one
of fact. Much of the impetus for this shift seems to be a sense that
nonmembers are "really" in a region meriting the term "Indian country"
only when the area has retained its "Indian character" -a culturally loaded
concept of dubious determinacy in the hands of non-Indian judges.
As the next Part indicates, this same problem has arisen when the Court
has encountered the authority of tribes to regulate nonmembers even within
acknowledged reservation boundaries. Here, too, the traditional principles
have been displaced on a case-by-case basis by unarticulated values and felt
necessities.
132. See Frickey, supra note 22, at 385-417 (describing the methodology of the Marshall
Court in federal Indian law cases).
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IV. DIVESTING TRIBAL TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY BY
REDUCING THE SOVEREIGNTY
In its first two encounters with assertions of tribal power over
nonmembers in Indian country, the Supreme Court dismissed the objections
of nonmembers and affirmed tribal authority. These cases, which involved
tribal-court jurisdiction over civil disputes with non-Indian plaintiffs and
tribal capacity to exercise power authorized by Congress, are the subjects of
Sections A and B of this Part. The implication of these precedents that
tribes possess full territorial sovereignty did not survive later cases
involving more difficult questions of tribal authority over nonmembers,
however. Unfortunately, the Court has failed to articulate a principled and
coherent understanding of this series of decisions. Accordingly, the cases
are best categorized by subject matter rather than by rationale. In the
absence of congressional authorization of, or nonmember consent to, tribal
action, the Court has forbidden tribal criminal jurisdiction over
nonmembers, as Section C documents, and precluded civil regulation of
nonmembers unless their conduct threatens core tribal interests, as
Section D demonstrates. These cases might be explainable by a judicial
presumption that tribal regulatory authority over nonmembers is curtailed
when they may not be excluded from the reservation, but this rationale
cannot be squared with cases upholding tribal power to tax them, as Section
E demonstrates. Finally, as Section F explains, in yet another series of cases
concerning tribal-court jurisdiction in civil cases with nonmember
defendants, the Court initially took a sympathetic approach to tribal
authority, only to undercut it in more recent precedent.
What follows is an elaborate account of six categories of cases. When
the decisions are assessed on their own terms, the search for coherence
within and across these categories shall prove elusive. Later, in Part V, I
suggest that a different framework of analysis may prove more successful
in explaining the underlying pattern of precedent.
A. The Foundational Precedent: Williams v. Lee and Tribal-Court
Jurisdiction in Civil Cases Brought by Nonmembers Against Members
In Williams v. Lee,133 a non-Indian operating a store on the Navajo
Reservation brought an action in Arizona state court against a Navajo
family that had allegedly failed to pay for goods sold on credit. The state
courts entertained the case because no federal law preempted their
jurisdiction. 34 On review, the Supreme Court faced its first decision in "the
133. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
134. See Williams v. Lee, 319 P.2d 998 (Ariz. 1958).
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modem era of federal Indian law," ' at least in part because this was the
Court's first encounter with tribal sovereignty in a contemporary context in
which non-Indians were involved.
Because no treaty or statute controlled, the Court had significant
discretion in resolving the dispute. Should it adhere to traditional
constructs, rooted in Marshall Court decisions adopted when Indian
reservations consisted simply of Indian land inhabited by Indians, to
invalidate state jurisdiction and leave the matter to the tribal court? Or
should changed circumstances-the granting of United States citizenship to
Indians; the complicated post-allotment demographic context; a few
Allotment-era and later precedents undermining the notion that the federal-
tribal relationship left no role for states in Indian country"k---lead the Court
to abandon tribal sovereignty and allow state courts to apply state law to
resolve the dispute?
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Black blended the decisions of
the Marshall Court and the institutional sensitivity of the traditional
constructs with the path of subsequent federal Indian law. Black wrote that
tribes, which originally were "separate nations," "' had been induced
"[t]hrough conquest and treaties.., to give up complete independence and
the right to go to war in exchange for federal protection, aid, and grants of
land."' 38 Nonetheless, he continued, Worcester had held that tribes
remained independent of state law on the reservation. Black described
Worcester as one of Chief Justice Marshall's "most courageous and
eloquent opinions." 39 ", Despite bitter criticism and the defiance of Georgia
which refused to obey this Court's mandate," Black continued, "the broad
principles of that decision came to be accepted as law." "
But what of later precedents allowing state law to seep into Indian
country? For the Court in Williams, they did not undermine the general rule
of Worcester, which could be dislodged only by agreement or statute, not
by judicial decision. Thus, the Court concluded: "Essentially, absent
governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the state
action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws
and be ruled by them.""'4 State-court jurisdiction "would undermine the
135. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIE, AND THE LAW 1 (1987).




140. Id. Guido Calabresi, who clerked for Justice Black at the time, once mentioned to me
that Justice Frankfurter's note to Black joining the opinion in Williams said that he was pleased to
concur in this indirect reaffirmation of Brown v. Board of Education. Williams was decided only a
year after Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), involving the resistance of state officials to school
integration. See Robert A. Burt, Constitutional Las, and the Teaching of the Parables. 93 YALE
LJ. 455, 482 n.89 (1984) (reporting a similar conversation with Calabresi).
141. Williams, 358 U.S. at 220.
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authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence would
infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves," 142 presumably
because self-government includes having one's own courts apply one's own
rules of decision to disputes arising within one's own territory.
But what of the more complicated demographic context? The Court in
Williams forced the non-Indian plaintiff to bring the case in tribal court 43
and assumed that it would be resolved under tribal law, even though he had
no vote in tribal elections and, presumably, only tribal members could serve
on juries. Any claim of unfairness, Justice Black wrote, foundered on the
notion of territorial sovereignty and its corollary, implied consent to
governmental authority. Consistent with the traditional principles, Black
considered Congress, not the Court, the appropriate institution for altering
federal Indian law in light of changed circumstances.144
On its surface, Williams was simply about state-court jurisdiction. The
Court's rationale for barring that jurisdiction, however, reaffirmed the
concept of tribal sovereignty in the modem, more demographically
complicated era. Perhaps one reason the Court did so was that, from the
tribal point of view, Williams was a wonderful test case. It arose on the
Navajo Reservation, which was never generally subjected to allotment and
is the paradigm of a reservation retaining its Indian character in the modern
era. 145 Moreover, as Justice Black noted, the Navajo had tribal courts in
place to resolve "suits by outsiders against Indian defendants." 146 Finally,
unlike a non-Indian reservation landowner, the non-Indian in Williams
could not claim any arguably reasonable expectations concerning immunity
from tribal regulation: He was on the reservation only by virtue of a federal
license to be an "Indian trader." 147
Over a decade and a half passed before the Supreme Court again
encountered the assertion of tribal authority over a non-Indian found on a
reservation. When it returned to the subject, it considered a case that, in
142. Id. at 223.
143. The case involved no federal question or diverse citizenship supporting federal
jurisdiction.
144. Black wrote:
It is immaterial that respondent is not an Indian. He was on the Reservation and the
transaction with an Indian took place there.... The cases in this Court have
consistently guarded the authority of Indian governments over their reservations.
Congress recognized this authority in the Navajos in the Treaty of 1868. and has done
so ever since. If this power is to be taken away from them, it is for Congress to do it.
Williams, 358 U.S. at 223 (citations omitted). Earlier Black had noted that Congress had given
Arizona the ability to obtain jurisdiction for its courts over civil cases arising on Indian
reservations and that the state had never exercised this option. See id. at 222-23 (citing Public Law
280, Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, §§ 6-7, 67 Stat. 590).
145. See supra text accompanying note 73.
146. Williams, 358 U.S. at 222. At the time, such tribal courts were relatively scarce. See
WILKINSON, supra note 135, at 2.
147. See Williams, 358 U.S. at 217.
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some sense, might have been considerably easier than Williams for ruling in
favor of tribal sovereignty.
B. Congressional Authorization of Tribal Power
United States v. Mazurie'u directly posed the complaint of non-Indians
that they should not be subject to tribal authority. Unlike Williams, where
tribal capacity to establish law on the reservation came into the equation
indirectly, as a matter of judicial civil jurisdiction, Mazurie involved non-
Indians subjected to federal criminal prosecution for failing to adhere to
tribal law.
Mazurie concerned a federal criminal statute requiring all vendors of
alcohol in Indian country to comply with both state and tribal law.'49 Non-
Indians who operated a bar on reservation land that they held in fee failed to
comply with tribal liquor licensing laws and were federally prosecuted. The
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit threw out the case on the ground that
the statute exceeded the power of Congress over Indian affairs.'
Embracing the popular sentiment of non-Indians in Indian country,'' the
court of appeals viewed the tribe as simply a membership organization of
American citizens that could have no authority over "other citizens who do
not belong, and who cannot participate in any way in the [tribal]
organization."' 52 The court concluded that "Congress cannot delegate its
authority to a private, voluntary organization, which is obviously not a
governmental agency, to regulate a business on privately owned lands, no
matter where located." '
In reversing, the Supreme Court did not reach the question whether the
tribe's inherent sovereignty was expansive enough to allow it to regulate
non-Indian alcohol vendors in the absence of authorization by Congress.
Instead, the Court took a narrower route, concluding that the statute
constituted a lawful congressional delegation of regulatory power to the
tribe. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Rehnquist conceptualized
tribes not as "private, voluntary organizations," "" but instead as "unique
aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members
148. 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
149. Federal criminal law outlaws the introduction of alcohol into Indian country. see iL at
545 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1154), unless the transaction is in conformity with state law "and with an
ordinance duly adopted by the tribe having jurisdiction over such area of Indian country, certified
by the Secretary of the Interior, and published in the Federal Register," id. at 547 n.4 (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 1161).
150. See United States v. Mazurie, 487 F.2d 14 (10th Cir. 1973).
151. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
152. Mazurie, 487 F.2d at 19.
153. Id
154. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
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and their territory." '55 Because tribes were governmental entities possessing
at least some "independent authority over the subject matter," 156 Congress
could lawfully "vest in tribal councils this portion of its own authority 'to
regulate Commerce ... with the Indian tribes."' 157
But what of the non-Indians' complaints of unfairness? The Court
offered three rejoinders. First, it quoted language from Williams
recognizing tribal territorial sovereignty. 58 Second, the Court noted that
Congress had provided protection against arbitrary tribal action: Tribal
ordinances were subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, and
the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968151 imposed upon tribes most of the
limitations of the Bill of Rights, including due process and equal protection.
Third, if the tribal regulation were viewed as an act of delegated federal
authority, the Fifth Amendment might itself attach to the tribal action."
Mazurie was an easy case. In an area in which Congress has "plenary
power," one would expect the Court to defer to an explicit congressional
command. Moreover, the situation of the non-Indians in Mazurie hardly
seemed dire: Williams had long before found implied non-Indian consent to
tribal territorial sovereignty, and Congress had expressly authorized the
tribe to act. In addition to this ample notice of their obligations to obey
tribal law, the civil rights of nonmembers seemed adequately protected as
well.
But even if easy cases do not make bad law, they can warp perceptions
of the surrounding legal domain. If the presence of express congressional
authorization of tribal power made Mazurie simple, would the absence of
such explicit permission in later cases give rise to a negative inference
about tribal power in those settings? What should be done in intermediate
situations, in which Congress has not expressly authorized the tribes to
regulate non-Indians but has sent signals disapproving of state regulatory
power over the same subject matter?
Reconsider Williams in this light. Congress had provided no clear
answer to the jurisdictional conflict between state and tribal courts over
reservation-based civil suits by non-Indians against tribal members. The
Court had to choose between leaving the traditional approach in place,
thereby placing the burden of inertia to obtain congressional relief from
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8). The Court supported its conclusion that the
delegation of legislative power is less troublesome when the recipient possesses independent
authority over the subject matter by citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S.
304 (1936). See Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 557.
158. See Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 558 (quoting the passage from Williams found supra note
144).
159. Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 201-203, 82 Stat. 73, 77-78 (1968) (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1994)).
160. See Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 558 n.12.
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tribal authority on those similarly situated to the non-Indian plaintiff, and
abandoning those constructs and shifting the burden of legislative inertia to
the tribes. Thus in Williams, as in most other federal Indian law disputes,
where Congress has not settled the matter, resolution turns on the
application of judicially constructed presumptions. Traditionally, these
presumptions have favored the tribes, but perhaps by the mid-twentieth
century this scheme was insufficiently sensitive to the changed
circumstances in Indian country.
The Court in Williams stuck with the traditional approach, but it was
not without some congressional guidance in doing so. Although Congress
had never expressly either forbidden state courts or authorized tribal courts
to exercise jurisdiction over non-Indian plaintiffs for reservation-based
causes of action, it had provided, in Public Law 280, a means for Arizona to
assume jurisdiction over such cases. 6' The enactment of Public Law 280
thus gave rise to a negative inference about congressional intent to allow
state courts to exercise jurisdiction over such cases in the absence of state
compliance with the statute's opt-in scheme.
A negative inference concerning state power is not nearly as probative
of the extent of tribal sovereignty as direct congressional authorization of
tribal authority, of course. Indeed, if all that courts needed to resolve these
disputes was the availability of a plausible negative inference, the tribes
would prevail in all cases except those in which a federal statute or treaty
expressly forbade them to regulate. This is so because the traditional
constructs purport to set the relevant baseline of tribal power over non-
Indians: The power exists unless the tribe has expressly ceded it away or
Congress has expressly abrogated it. And yet it was the tension between the
traditional approach and the changed circumstances in Indian country that
gave rise to the extensive litigation about tribal authority over non-Indians
that began in Williams.
Taken together, Williams and Mazurie support the notion that tribal
sovereignty is territorial, reaching Indian and non-Indian alike on the
reservation. Yet the express congressional authorization in Mazurie and the
implied congressional disapproval of competing state-court jurisdiction in
Williams made these decisions potentially distinguishable in later cases as
being based on express or implied congressional intent rather than on the
traditional baselines of tribal sovereignty. Moreover, one can easily imagine
situations involving tribal regulation of nonmembers in which the stakes are
more substantial than in these cases.'62 An obvious contrast to Williams (a
161. See supra note 144.
162. Williams simply narrows the courts available to non-Indians to collect reservation-based
debts from tribal members. Presumably, creditors who wish to avoid tribal court have other means
to protect their interests, and if they do not, nothing prevents them from ceasing to do business on
the reservation. Mazurie did involve the prosecution of non-Indians for disobeying tribal law, but
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civil case with a non-Indian plaintiff) and Mazurie (a federal prosecution of
a non-Indian) would be a tribal criminal prosecution of a non-Indian in
tribal court. It did not take long for such a case to emerge.
C. Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction over Nonmembers
1. Oliphant-Non-Indians and Criminal Jurisdiction
In 1978, three years after it decided Mazurie, the Supreme Court
handed down Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe.'63 A non-Indian who
lived on the Port Madison Reservation of the Suquamish Indian Tribe in the
State of Washington had allegedly assaulted a tribal police officer; another
such non-Indian had allegedly crashed his vehicle into a tribal police car
after a high-speed chase. The state could not prosecute them." 4 The federal
government could have, 65 but apparently never did. The tribe sought to do
SO.
The absence of state-court jurisdiction in Oliphant was clearer than it
was over the non-Indian's cause of action in Williams. Unlike in Williams,
however, federal jurisdiction was present in Oliphant. Thus, the case turned
on whether the federal jurisdiction was exclusive or whether the tribal court
had concurrent jurisdiction. The issue was of practical as well as theoretical
importance, because if the tribes lacked authority they would have no
effective criminal sanctions available against non-Indians unless the United
States Attorney-who might be located hundreds of miles away-
prosecuted even minor offenses in federal court.
In Oliphant, Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion identified no treaty in
which the tribe had ceded away its authority.66 nor any federal statute that
abrogated the tribe's police power.'67 Under the traditional constructs, that
in a context in which Congress had incorporated tribal law into federal law, the prosecutor was the
United States Attorney, and the prosecution was in federal court, with all constitutional procedural
protections available. See Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 545-50.
163. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). For criticism of Oliphant, see, for example, Russel Lawrence
Barsh & James Youngblood Henderson, The Betrayal: Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe and
the Hunting of the Snark, 63 MINN. L. REV. 609 (1979); and Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra
of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man 's
Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 219.
164. States covered by Public Law 280 have criminal jurisdiction over Indian country found
within them. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1994). At one point Washington had Public Law 280
jurisdiction over the Port Madison Reservation, but pursuant to a statutory procedure the state had
retroceded this authority back to the federal government before these incidents occurred. See
Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 1976). Absent a delegation of federal authority,
such as that found in Public Law 280, state courts have criminal jurisdiction in Indian country
only when both the victim and the perpetrator are non-Indian. See United States v. McBratney,
104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881).
165. See 18 U.S.C. § 1152.
166. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 206.
167. See id. at 201-06.
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should have ended the matter-the tribe retained its inherent territorial
sovereignty.
Indeed, even moving beyond this approach and examining the
implications of related congressional actions, as might have been done in
Williams and Mazurie, supports this conclusion. The Indian Civil Rights
Act (ICRA) requires tribes to accord "any person" many of the criminal-
procedure guarantees of the Bill of Rights, '" suggesting that Congress
assumed that non-Indians could be prosecuted by tribes." The statute
providing federal jurisdiction over offenses by non-Indians against
Indians 170 contains no hint that concurrent tribal jurisdiction is preempted.
Finally, basic systemic concerns support concurrent tribal jurisdiction.
First, in addition to requiring tribes to respect basic civil liberties, ICRA
provides that someone confined by a tribe may seek federal habeas corpus
relief.171 Thus, non-Indian criminal defendants in tribal courts would be
better protected against tribal action than are the non-Indian civil plaintiffs
who are relegated to those courts under Williams, for the latter have no
federal means to ensure compliance with ICRA." Second, because federal
courts and prosecutors are not well situated to handle local crimes, as a
functional matter the police power in Indian country should be allocated
between the two local jurisdictions, the state and the tribe. Since Worcester,
however, state authority in Indian country has been generally precluded
absent clear congressional authorization,' and there are obvious policy
reasons for doing so."7 In a situation like that in Oliphant, where the state
lacks such authorization, the most efficient approach would be for the tribe
to prosecute minor offenses and to refer serious crimes to the United States
Attorney. ICRA, in fact, encourages this approach because it limits the
criminal sanctions that a tribe may impose.
7 1
Despite all these formal and functional justifications, the Court in
Oliphant held that "Indians do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-
168. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1994).
169. Indeed, as introduced, the bill provided that its protections extended to "American
Indians"; a later amendment changed this to "any person," suggesting that Congress assumed that
tribes could have jurisdiction over non-Indians. See Frickey, supra note 68, at 1162-63.
170. See 18 U.S.C. § 1152.
171. See 25 U.S.C. § 1303.
172. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1978) (holding that ICRA
provides no implied cause of action for civil relief against a tribe in federal court).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 41-44.
174. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886) (lodging plenary power over
Indian affairs in Congress rather than the states in part because tribes owe no allegiance to the
states, receive no protection from them, and "[b]ecause of the local ill feeling, the people of the
States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies").
175. At the time of Oliphant, ICRA limited tribal sanctions to six months in jail and/or a
$500 fine. See Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 202(7). 82 Stat. 73, 77. A
1986 amendment allows tribes to impose a term of one year in jail and/or a fine of S5000. The
current version is codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7).
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Indians absent affirmative delegation of such power by Congress." 76
Because no treaty cession or congressional abrogation supported this
conclusion, the Court fell back upon the only other theory of diminished
tribal authority: the one prohibiting tribes from exercising powers
"inconsistent with their status" 177 as domestic dependent nations. In effect,
the Court reopened a category of diminished tribal authority that had been
thought closed forever since the Marshall Court.'78 For the first time in 150
years, the Court took it upon itself to impose new limitations on tribal
sovereignty.
Although Justice Rehnquist conceded that territorial sovereignty is
"central" to the interests of any government, 79 he concluded that tribal
criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers was inconsistent with tribal status
for two reasons. The first, a supposed "commonly shared presumption of
Congress, the Executive Branch, and lower federal courts that tribal courts
do not have the power to try non-Indians," 180 in fact carried little weight.' 8 '
The second, and controlling, factor was the interest of the United States in
protecting its citizens from "unwarranted intrusions on their personal
liberty.... By submitting to the overriding sovereignty of the United
States, Indian tribes therefore necessarily give up their power to try non-
Indian citizens of the United States except in a manner acceptable to
Congress." 182 Tribes had been "incorporat[ed] into the territory of the
United States" -they are "domestic" sovereigns whose authority is subject
to evaluation by the Court.' 83 Their submission to the United States made
them "dependent" as well-their "exercise of separate power is
constrained so as not to conflict with the interests of this overriding
sovereignty." "
As with the reservation-diminishment cases analyzed in Part III,
Oliphant is subject to a realistic reading. The demographics in Oliphant
made it a horrible test case for affirming tribal sovereignty in the modern
176. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribes, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978).
177. Id. (quoting the Court of Appeals below) (emphasis omitted).
178. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36, 61-65. In introducing his overview of the
Marshall Court's decisions, Justice Rehnquist wrote that "[w]e have already described sone of
the inherent limitations on tribal powers that stem from their incorporation into the United
States." Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 209 (emphasis added). Before Oliphant, one would have thought
that the Marshall Court had specified all such limitations.
179. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210.
180. Id. at 206.
181. Justice Rehnquist admitted that this factor was "not conclusive on the issue before us."
Id. In fact, the assertion lacks historical support. See Frickey, supra note 68, at 1161-63.
182. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210. Apparently, the Court considered ICRA insufficiently
protective of non-Indians because the Act did not prevent the use of an all-Indian jury, see
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context. The case was all over but for the rationale when, at the end of the
first paragraph of the opinion, the first footnote reported that 2928 non-
Indians and only fifty tribal members lived on the reservation.'85 As Vine
Deloria has written, this situation essentially mooted the argument for tribal
sovereignty. 6
The challenge for the Court in Oliphant, as in the diminishment cases,
was to articulate a legalistic rationale for deferring to the current context.
The opinion is subject to at least two readings. One-which is wildly
counterfactual-is that the tribes willingly submitted to the overriding
sovereignty of the United States. Another, much more plausible,
understanding is that the outcome in Oliphant, like those in the
diminishment cases, is not based on Indian consent. Under this vision, the
United States involuntarily incorporated the tribes and achieved dominant
sovereignty over them by an assertion of colonial prerogatives that
eventually reached contemporary contextual fruition. The colonial process
did not end at some point in the distant past. Instead, it is an ongoing
process that is not even limited to new congressional exercises of its
plenary power over Indian affairs. The ongoing colonization of the
continent now includes a judicial role as well, adjudicating the depreciated
status of tribal authority on a case-by-case basis.
Although this theory makes sense of Oliphant, it lacked precedential
support. Recall that the Marshall Court had simply deferred to past colonial
practice in limiting tribal authority to engage in land transactions and treaty
relations." 7 The Court embraced a political-question-like notion that, in a
direct conflict between the colonizing nation and the indigenous entity, the
colonial judiciary, as the "courts of the conqueror,""85 must defer to the
185. See id. at 193 n.1.
186. According to Deloria:
The facts of the situation make the Indian argument not only moot but demonstrate that
it was based on an idea of sovereignty having little relation to actual reality.
... The doctrine of tribal sovereignty, perhaps relevant for a large reservation
such as the Navajo with millions of acres of land and over 100.000 Indian residents,
was expected to control the court's thinking in defiance of the actual facts. Surely. here
was an instance of a doctrine run amok.
When attorneys and scholars come to believe that doctrines have a greater reality
than the data from which they are derived, all aspects of the judicial process suffer
accordingly.
Vine Deloria, Jr., Laws Founded in Justice and Humanity: Reflections on the Content and
Character of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 203, 215 (1989).
187. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
188. In Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). Chief Justice Marshall stated:
We will not enter into the controversy, whether agriculturists. merchants, and
manufacturers, have a right, on abstract principles, to expel hunters from the territory
they possess, or to contract their limits. Conquest gives a title which the Courts of the
conqueror cannot deny, whatever the private and speculative opinions of individuals
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prerogatives of its sister political branch.'89 In short, the Marshall Court
considered tribes subservient to clear assertions of authority deemed
necessary for the colonizing government to conduct the colonial process
efficiently. Oliphant involved no conflict of this sort. Congress had never
outlawed tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, and such tribal
conduct did not threaten to undermine Congress's authority over Indian
affairs. Instead of involving a conflict between sovereigns, Oliphant
involved a matter of individual rights against governmental authority. But
when the Marshall Court had encountered a case of arguable tribal
mistreatment of a non-Indian, it took no steps to protect the person.'90 In
short, something new was at work in Oliphant.
If Oliphant lacked support in the venerable precedent it invoked, it bore
a similarity to more recent cases. As Part III demonstrated, in the
reservation-diminishment cases the Court has attempted to protect non-
Indians found on allotted reservations from the authority of a government
(the tribe) in which they have no vote.' 9' The setting in Oliphant was
similar: Allotment had devastated the Port Madison Reservation. Because
of the bizarre demographics there, non-Indian residents might have had
"justifiable expectations" of immunity from tribal regulation similar to
those supposedly held by the non-Indians in the diminishment cases. The
problem was that in Oliphant there was no contention that the reservation
had been diminished; thus, the Court had to limit tribal territorial
sovereignty by limiting the sovereignty rather than the territory.
But what of Williams and Mazurie, where the Court concluded that
non-Indians were subject to tribal power? The easiest distinction is that
Oliphant involved tribal criminal jurisdiction-the ultimate tribal intrusion
upon non-Indian personal liberty. In Mazurie, the criminal jurisdiction was
federal, and the Constitution squarely attached to it. Williams involved
tribal civil jurisdiction over a cause of action arising from the voluntary and
commercial non-Indian presence in the quintessential region of Indian
sovereignty, the Navajo Nation.
Nonetheless, taken as a whole, Williams, Mazurie, and Oliphant may
lack coherence. From the standpoint of fairness, subjecting a non-Indian
with a retail store in Indian country to the exclusive jurisdiction of tribal
court for collection actions may be at least as troubling as subjecting a non-
Indian reservation resident to tribal jurisdiction over minor crimes, when
the tribe may impose only modest sanctions, must follow most of the
guarantees found in the Bill of Rights, and is subject to federal habeas
189. See supra the opening paragraphs of Section II.B.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 61-65.
191. See supra notes 77-132 and accompanying text.
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corpus review. 2 One is left wondering whether there is anything more
substantial than a judicial gut instinct at work in these cases.'9 3
2. Duro-Nonmember Indians and Criminal Jurisdiction
In a case following Oliphant, the Court again considered tribal criminal
jurisdiction and produced an opinion that more clearly revealed the sources
of the values at work in the judicial divestment of tribal authority. Duro v.
Reina'9 concerned tribal prosecution of a nonmember Indian-that is, a
member of a tribe different from the one bringing the charges. Oliphant's
concern about protecting the personal liberty of citizens against tribal
intrusion foreordained the conclusion that the tribe lacked jurisdiction.'
Duro forthrightly acknowledged that, after Oliphant, tribes lack full
territorial sovereignty. 96 Instead, "the retained sovereignty of the tribes is
that needed to control their own internal relations, and to preserve their
unique customs and social order." 197 Duro distinguished Williams as
involving tribal-court jurisdiction over a civil, not a criminal, matter.'" It
concluded: "The exercise of criminal jurisdiction subjects a person not only
to the adjudicatory power of the tribunal, but also to the prosecuting power
of the tribe, and involves a far more direct intrusion on personal
liberties." 199
192. See supra notes 168-175 and accompanying text.
193. Perhaps these cases can be explained by asking whether the Court could attribute its
result to the action of a more democratic institution. In Mazurie, Congress had mandated that
tribal legislative authority reached non-Indians. making it easy to suggest that any unfairness was
the work of Congress, not of the Court, and accordingly that attempts to change the outcome
belonged in the legislative, not the judicial, process. Similarly, in Williams, Congress, through
Public Law 280, had put in place a procedure whereby Arizona could obtain civil judicial
jurisdiction over the non-Indian's cause of action, and Arizona had failed to use it. It is not easy to
distinguish Williams and Oliphant on this score, however. Recall that. by virtue of Public Law
280, Washington had possessed, and then retroceded, jurisdiction over the reservation involved in
Oliphant. See supra note 164. The retrocession was valid only because the Secretary of the
Interior accepted it. See Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 1976). Recall as well
that Congress, in the Indian Civil Rights Act, has subjected tribal courts to most Bill of Rights
limitations and to federal habeas corpus review. Thus, the Court in Oliphant could have upheld
tribal jurisdiction on the ground that it was deferring to congressional, executive, and state action.
Congress could easily have altered that result, of course. Thus, it is not clear that deference to the
federal and state political branches can support the results in both Williams and Oliphant.
194. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
195. In Duro, the Court noted that, in addition to civil-liberties justifications, Oliphant had
relied upon the perceived shared assumptions of the federal branches. See id. at 705. Considering
the weakness of this argument in Oliphant, see supra text accompanying notes 180-181, it is
remarkable to read that a "review of history" concerning the issue in Duro was "somewhat less
illuminating than in Oliphant, but tends to support the conclusion we reach." Duro, 495 U.S. at
688-89.
196. See Duro, 495 U.S. at 685.
197. Id. at 685-86.
198. See id. at 687.
199. Id at 688.
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The Court in Duro attempted to make sense of the precedents by
articulating a theory of consent to government. Tribal criminal jurisdiction
over members is "justified by the voluntary character of tribal membership
and the concomitant right of participation in a tribal government, the
authority of which rests on consent. ' 200 In contrast, nonmember Indians,
like other American citizens, "are embraced within our Nation's 'great
solicitude that its citizens be protected.., from unwarranted intrusions on
their personal liberty.""'2 " That the Court purported to be extraordinarily
concerned about civil liberties was demonstrated by a remarkable passage
that raises doubts about whether Congress-despite its plenary power over
Indian affairs-could, as it later did,202 authorize tribal criminal jurisdiction
over nonmembers:
Our cases suggest constitutional limitations even on the ability of
Congress to subject American citizens to criminal proceedings
before a tribunal that does not provide constitutional protections as
a matter of right. Cf. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). We have
approved delegation to an Indian tribe of the authority to
promulgate rules that may be enforced by criminal sanction in
federal court, [citing Mazurie], but no delegation of authority to a
tribe has to date included the power to punish non-members in
tribal court. We decline to produce such a result through
recognition of inherent tribal authority.0 3
The citation to Reid v. Covert suggests the extent to which the Court in
Duro viewed tribal prosecution of nonmembers as bizarre. In Reid, the
Court, with no majority opinion, held that civilian dependents of military
personnel stationed overseas could not be prosecuted for capital offenses at
courts-martial, where trial by jury was unavailable." Thus, the Court in
Duro implicitly compared the prosecution of Duro, an Indian, in the court
of another tribe, which by federal statute was subject to most Bill of Rights
limitations and to federal habeas corpus review, to the prosecution of
Covert, who had allegedly murdered her serviceman husband in England, in
a court-martial subject only to the limitations imposed by military
200. Id. at 694.
201. Id. at 692 (quoting Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978)
(alteration in original)).
202. See infra note 321 and accompanying text.
203. Duro, 495 U.S. at 693-94.
204. In Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), Justice Black's plurality opinion, joined by Chief
Justice Warren and Justices Douglas and Brennan, concluded that the Constitution applied
overseas to federal acts taken against American citizens. Justices Frankfurter and Harlan,
concurring separately in the judgment, limited their extraterritorial constitutional inquiry to capital
cases. The other two participating Justices (Clark and Burton) dissented. For an examination of
the extraterritorial effect of the Constitution, see generally GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO
THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996).
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regulations. The prosecuting tribe seemingly took on the aura of the
military-a closed, insulated institution deemed beyond ordinary principles
of law by virtue of its unique status and its inscrutability to the judiciary-
and the tribal court was compared to a court-martial rather than to a court of
general jurisdiction. The tribe and the military had authority over their
members, but neither had the requisite connection to Duro or Covert to
subject them to extraordinary governmental power unconstrained by full
constitutional protections. 5
In particular, the reference in Duro to Reid may have been motivated by
a sense that, as in a trial by court-martial of a civilian dependent of a
servicemember, a nonmember subjected to tribal-court prosecution does not
receive a jury of peers selected from the broader community to which she
belongs. The plurality opinion in Reid stressed that the military officers
empaneled to conduct a court-martial "do not and cannot have the
independence of jurors drawn from the general public or of civilian
judges."' Similarly, Duro stated that "[t]ribal courts are often
'subordinate to the political branches of tribal governments.' '
Whatever analogies the imagination might generate, however, Duro's
citation of Reid raises far more questions than it answers. Duro conceded
that the Constitution does not apply to tribal action" and that the Indian
Civil Rights Act stops short of imposing upon tribes statutory limitations
that parallel the Constitution in all respects.209 How, then, is it that general
205. The Court in Duro stated:
With respect to... internal laws and usages, the tribes are left with broad freedom not
enjoyed by any other governmental authority in this country.... This is all the more
reason to reject an extension of tribal authority over those who have not given the
consent of the governed that provides a fundamental basis for power within our
constitutional system.
Duro, 495 U.S. at 694 (citation omitted); cf. Reid, 354 U.S. at 19-23 (plurality opinion) (finding
that Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution, which empowers Congress "[t]o make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces" and has been held to authorize trial of
servicemembers without full Bill of Rights protections, did not apply to civilian dependents of
servicemembers, because they were not in the military service).
206. Reid, 354 U.S. at 36 (plurality opinion).
207. Duro, 495 U.S. at 693. The general legal community knows little about the structure and
operation of tribal courts. For a recent survey of tribal-court opinions that concludes that non-
Indian criticism of tribal courts is often unfounded and grounded in ignorance, see Nell Jessup
Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian Tribal Courts. 22 AM.
INDIAN L. REv. 285 (1998). As Joseph Singer has pointed out to me, it seems odd to assume the
worst about tribal judges when, in light of the plenary power doctrine, they have every incentive
to perform in a manner acceptable to Congress.
208. See Duro, 495 U.S. at 693.
209. See id. ("The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 provides some statutory guarantees of fair
procedure, but these guarantees are not equivalent to their constitutional counterparts. There is, for
example, no right under the Act to appointed counsel for those unable to afford a lawyer."). In
addition, see Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 194 & 194 n.4 (1978). which
states that the Indian Civil Rights Act does not preclude tribes from using all-member juries in
criminal cases.
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constitutional values so centrally inform the Duro opinion?2t° What
authorizes the Court to impose limitations beyond those already applied to
tribes by Congress in ICRA?21 1 In Reid, one issue was whether the
constitutional limitations ordinarily applying to federal action operated
extraterritorially. Duro dealt with inherent tribal power-which is beyond
the reach of the Bill of Rights but subject to plenary congressional power-
exercised within its customary territorial domain. Duro might suggest, in
roundabout parallelism to Reid-which held that there is no categorical
exception to the application of the Bill of Rights to extraterritorial federal
action-that, when nonmembers are regulated, there is an exception to the
nonapplication of the Bill of Rights to intraterritorial tribal action. Any
effort to render this instinct doctrinally coherent seems doomed, however. If
the Constitution applies to tribal action, it must protect members as well as
nonmembers. Yet Duro made clear that members cannot invoke the
Constitution when in conflict with their tribes.212
Thus, Reid and Duro seem to have less to do with each other than it
might at first have appeared. Moreover, unlike Reid, where the source of
judicial authority-the Constitution-was clear and its scope was
contested, Duro does nothing to clarify either the source or the scope of the
ongoing judicial power, first recognized in Oliphant, to truncate tribal
sovereignty on a case-by-case basis at the behest of nonmembers. Yet the
analogy between the jurisdiction of courts-martial over nonservicemembers
210. Cf. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210 ("But from the formation of the Union and the adoption of
the Bill of Rights, the United States has manifested an equally great solicitude that its citizens be
protected by the United States from unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty.").
211. In addition, the result in Duro was inconsistent with another indicator of congressional
intent, because it created a jurisdictional void in an area governed by federal statute. The Major
Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994), provides that, in Indian country, "lany Indian" who
commits one of the serious crimes listed in the statute is subject to federal prosecution. For less
serious offenses by Indians, federal law extends into Indian country the criminal statutes
governing federal enclaves, but contains an exception for "offenses committed by one Indian
against the person or property of another Indian." 18 U.S.C. § 1152. Thus, these statutes provide
that "nonmajor crimes" committed by one "Indian against the person or property of another
Indian" fall outside federal jurisdiction. Because, in the absence of congressional authorization,
the states have criminal jurisdiction in Indian country only when both the victim and perpetrator
are non-Indian, see United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881). the inevitable
conclusion is that tribal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all "Indian/Indian" offenses that
are not major crimes. Because these statutes use the term " I ndian" rather than "member." their
plain meaning is that tribal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over nonmajor offenses committed
by all Indians, member and nonmember alike. By denying tribal courts jurisdiction over
nonmembers, Duro thus seemed to create a jurisdictional void in which no sovereign could
prosecute. Rather than viewing this absurd result as counseling against its holding, the Court in
Duro simply suggested that the problem be fixed by reinterpretation of the statutes, by tribal
consent to state jurisdiction, or by congressional legislation. See Duro, 495 U.S. at 697-98. These
suggestions substitute either formless judicial revisionism or tribal capitulation for any serious
grappling with the conundrum.
212. For the Court in Duro, tribal authority to regulate members free from constitutional
restraint turned on their consent. See Duro, 495 U.S. at 694. This consent, however, cannot
possibly rise to the level required to constitute a knowing and voluntary relinquishment of
constitutional rights. After all, both members and nonmembers are American citizens.
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and tribal-court criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers, and the implicit
assumption that the Constitution protects ordinary citizens from being
dragged into military or tribal justice, may speak volumes about the
background norms driving the ongoing judicial diminishment of tribal
authority.
213
D. Tribal Civil Regulation of Nonmembers in the Absence of
Congressional Approval
Soon after it precluded tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians in
Oliphant, the Court considered tribal civil regulation of nonmembers. Once
again, the legacy of allotment undermined the tribal position. And once
again, the precedential effect was chaotic. Based on Oliphant, in the
absence of congressional consent, one might have expected the Court to
preclude all tribal authority over nonmembers. Alternatively, given
Williams, which recognized exclusive tribal-court jurisdiction over civil
cases brought by non-Indians against tribal members, one might have
expected the Court to allow tribes to apply their civil laws to nonmembers.
The Court took neither tack.
In Montana v. United States, 2"4 a tribe outlawed nonmember hunting or
fishing even on fee lands owned by nonmembers as the result of allotment.
Justice Stewart's opinion in Montana began in Oliphant-like fashion,
stating that "[t]he areas in which such implicit divestiture of sovereignty
has been held to have occurred are those involving the relations betveen an
Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe." 25 He continued: "[E]xercise of
tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or
to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the
tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional delegation. 21 6
He concluded that "[s]ince regulation of hunting and fishing by
nonmembers of a tribe on lands no longer owned by the tribe bears no clear
relationship to tribal self-government or internal relations, the general
principles of retained inherent sovereignty did not authorize" the tribe to
regulate as it wished.2 1 7 More generally, he read Oliphant for the
proposition that "the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not
extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe."238
213. See infra Section V.B.
214. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
215. Id. at 564 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313. 326 (1978)). The language
quoted from Wheeler is dictum. Wheeler concerned whether a tribe retained inherent criminal
jurisdiction over its members. The Court in Wheeler upheld tribal authority on those facts.
216. IL
217. Id. at 564-65.
218. Id. at 565.
1999]
The Yale Law Journal
Justice Stewart then rapidly undercut these seemingly clear, if drastic,
principles by announcing what have become known as the "Montana
exceptions":
To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to
exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their
reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate,
through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of
nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or
its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or
other arrangements. [Citing, e.g., Williams.] A tribe may also retain
inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-
Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct
threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.19
These two categories are far from clear. As to the first, Duro did later
identify "consent" as the source of tribal authority. 2 0 But it must seem
ironic to the non-Indian merchant in Williams that his implied consent to
exclusive tribal-court civil jurisdiction was valid, while Oliphant's choice to
reside in Indian country could not support tribal criminal jurisdiction. More
generally, an examination of cases following Montana indicates that the
Court has not taken a consistent approach to nonmember consent to tribal
authority. 22' As to the second exception, tribal civil authority might extend
to nonconsenting nonmembers who undermine core tribal interests.
Two later cases concerned tribal civil regulation of nonmembers on
non-Indian property. In the first, Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands
of the Yakima Indian Nation,222 the tribe sought to zone all reservation
property, irrcluding nonmember fee lands. Four Justices, in an opinion by
Justice White, would have revised the second Montana exception to deny
tribal authority to zone nonmember land.2 3 For White, that exception
merely identified instances in which the tribe could complain to county
zoning authorities that activities on nonmember land interfered with the use
219. Id. at 565-66 (citations omitted).
220. See supra text accompanying note 200.
221. See Frickey, supra note 11, at 1768-77 (concluding that criminal jurisdiction cases turn
on tribal membership, that tribal-court civil jurisdiction and taxation cases turn more on the
traditional presumption that presence in a territory amounts to implied consent to governmental
authority, and that civil regulatory cases are too incoherent to support any obvious paradigm based
on consent). But see L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the
Millennium, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 809 (1996) (arguing that a "consent paradigm" best explains the
cases).
222. 492 U.S. 408 (1989). For an insightful critique, see Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty
and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (1991).
223. See Brendale, 492 U.S. at 428-30.
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of neighboring Indian landY. ' Three Justices, in an opinion by Justice
Blackmun, would have reread the second exception to provide presumptive
tribal authority to zone throughout the reservation.2 The remaining two
Justices controlled the outcome. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice
O'Connor, argued that context should control. He concluded that the tribe
could zone nonmember land in the closed area of the reservation, where
almost all the land was Indian trust land, the area was basically wilderness
and had significant cultural and religious significance for the tribe, and the
tribe had maintained its general authority to exclude nonmembers and
had retained "its legitimate interest in the preservation of the character of
the reservation." 7 In contrast, he concluded that the tribe had no power to
zone nonmember land in the opened part of the reservation, where the tribe
lacked the general authority to exclude nonmembers, where much of the
land was owned by nonmembers and had been developed, and where eighty
percent of the residents were nonmembers.' In Stevens's conclusion that
the "open area has lost its character as an exclusive tribal resource," ' one
hears the echo of the realistic reading of the diminishment cases, under
which the issue is whether the area in question has lost its "essential Indian
character." 3
The final case involving tribal civil regulation of nonmembers, South
Dakota v. Bourland,231 has already been mentioned. 2 Bourland concerned
whether the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe could regulate nonmember
hunting and fishing in a federal recreation area located on the reservation
but open to the general public. The federal statute creating the recreation
area did not clearly resolve the issue. The case seemed similar to Oliphant
and the later cases involving the implicit divestiture of retained tribal
sovereignty, for it appeared to involve whether, in the absence of clear
congressional guidance, the Court would itself further diminish tribal
territorial sovereignty by limiting the sovereignty.
Consider several ways in which the precedents interacted in the
Bourland situation. First, consistent with Williams's broad affirmation of
tribal-court civil jurisdiction over non-Indian plaintiffs, the Court could
have concluded that the voluntary presence of nonmembers on the
reservation subjected them to tribal civil authority. To be sure, that
224. See id. at 430-31.
225. See id at 462 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ.. concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
226. See i& at 438-44 (Stevens, J., joined by O'Connor, J., announcing the judgment).
227. Id at442.
228. See id at 444-47
229. Id at447.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 99-106. 112-113. 126, 131-132.
231. 508 U.S. 679 (1993).
232. See supra text accompanying notes 7-8.
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expansive view of nonmember consent might seem inconsistent with
Montana, but a potentially important distinction existed: In Bourland,
nonmembers were on federal land, not on nonmember fee land as in
Montana, and thus notions of personal liberty associated with property
ownership were arguably irrelevant. As this suggests, a second option in
Bourland would have been to expand the concern about nonmember civil
rights recognized most clearly in the criminal jurisdiction cases to create a
flat rule prohibiting tribal civil, as well as criminal, regulation of
nonmembers regardless of their location on the reservation. But that
outcome would have been inconsistent both with the result in Brendale,
which allowed the tribe to zone nonmember land in the closed reservation
area, and with the "Montana exception" that seemingly recognized tribal
authority to regulate nonmembers in compelling circumstances. It also
would have been in great tension with Williams, which assumed that the
tribal court would apply tribal law in exercising its exclusive jurisdiction
over a civil action brought by a non-Indian. Alternatively, a third approach
would have been to limit Montana and Brendale to the circumstance of
nonmember presence on nonmember fee lands, thereby allowing the tribe to
regulate nonmembers in the recreation area. Alas, this option also was
fraught with problems, for it would have been in tension with the
controlling two-Justice opinion in Brendale, in which Justice Stevens
stressed that when a reservation area is opened and the tribe loses the ability
to exclude nonmembers from it, the tribe may well have lost its civil
regulatory authority as well.
Perhaps understandably in light of this precedential chaos, Justice
Thomas's majority opinion in Bourland avoided all of these options. In
effect, it abandoned the unstated premise of all the implicit-divestiture
cases-that the absence of clear congressional intent concerning tribal
authority to regulate nonmembers left a void to be filled by the Court as a
matter of federal common law. But what was wrong with this premise,
Justice Thomas implied, was not the judicial recognition of new limitations
on tribal sovereignty. Rather, the mistake was in assuming that Congress
had not resolved the issue against tribal sovereignty in the first place.
Justice Thomas essentially returned to the approach taken in the
diminishment cases, where the Court consistently stated that only clear
congressional intent could result in diminishment, yet always found
diminishment where the purpose and effect of the congressional action were
to destroy the Indian character of the reservation area.233 He wrote that,
"regardless of whether land is conveyed pursuant to an Act of Congress for
homesteading or for flood control purposes, when Congress has broadly
opened up [reservation] land to non-Indians, the effect of the transfer is the
233. See supra text accompanying notes 127-129.
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destruction of pre-existing Indian rights to regulatory control."'  The
message of Bourland was that Congress, not the Court, bore the
responsibility for the loss of tribal geographical sovereignty.
In a sense, Bourland might seem a somewhat refreshing exercise in
candor. Of course Congress was the institution that opened up the
reservations and created the current jurisdictional nightmare. All the
diminishment cases, and every implicit-divestiture case except Bourland,
involved the current consequences of the congressionally adopted,
abandoned, but never undone policy of allotment, the general purpose of
which was to destroy reservations and to encourage Indian assimilation. As
explained earlier, 235 such a general purpose is usually a useful tool in
statutory interpretation where clear statutory text or legislative intent is
absent, as it has been in all these cases. When relying upon general purpose
seems consistent with the most practical outcome on the facts, deferring to
it can be particularly attractive. 6 At all events, such an approach ties the
result in the case to congressional lawmaking, not to judicial fleewheeling
in the absence of a statutory framework. Bourland might seem a useful
corrective to the unconstrained judicial policy judgments most clearly
evident in Oliphant and Duro, where a creeping constitutionalism seems to
have invaded federal Indian law and precluded tribal criminal jurisdiction
over nonmembers even though the Constitution does not apply to tribal
action. In addition, because it provides a potentially clear rule about the
abrogation of tribal regulatory power over nonmembers when Congress has
opened reservation areas, Bourland might seem preferable to the incoherent
aggregation of Justices concerning a similar question of tribal zoning power
in Brendale.
Unfortunately, there are nonetheless extreme problems with the result
and rationale in Bourland. As in the diminishment cases, the Court in
Bourland purported to adhere to the clear-statement canon concerning
congressional intent" 7 while abandoning it as a practical matter. Both the
diminishment cases and Bourland used a judicial sleight of hand, creating a
rule of law to trump the legal effect of the clear-statement canon. In the
diminishment cases, the rule concerns the legal effect of the presence of
"magic language" in the allotment statute or agreement;238 in Bourland it
involves the legal effect upon tribal sovereignty of broadly opening the
reservation to nonmembers.
234. Bourland, 508 U.S. at 692 (emphasis added).
235. See supra text accompanying note 127.
236. Thus, a purposive approach to statutory interpretation generally embraces the best
contextual answer consistent with the purposes animating the statute. See HART & SACKS, supra
note 127, at 1374-80.
237. See Bourland, 508 U.S. at 687.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 87-89. 111.
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Moreover, although the diminishment cases can at least be defended as
deferring to the "justifiable expectations" of non-Indians, 39 no such
contextual factors supported Bourland. Indeed, if the reasonable
expectations of nonmembers were all that were at stake, they would seem
amply protected merely by posting signs indicating that entry into the
recreational area subjected the nonmember to tribal hunting and fishing
laws. A nonmember hunting or fishing on private reservation land might
have "reasonable expectations" related to basic Anglo-American
assumptions about the autonomy of property owners. It is not all that
surprising that the Court in Montana protected those interests. But a
nonmember driving onto the reservation to hunt or fish on public land can
claim no such expectations. If, as both the diminishment cases and the
implicit-divestiture cases suggest, the basic judicial instinct is to protect the
reasonable reliance interests of nonmembers while preserving whatever
residual tribal sovereignty remains consistent with that approach, then
Bourland is a mystery.
Furthermore, as the next Section explains, Bourland's solicitude for
nonmember freedom from tribal civil regulation even when no obvious
reliance interest was at stake was radically inconsistent with the results in
cases concerning tribal taxation of nonmembers that had been decided a
decade earlier but were nowhere even mentioned in the Bourland opinion.
The tension between the Court's approach to tribal general civil regulation
of nonmembers and tribal taxation of nonmembers seems particularly
incoherent. After all, taxation is usually conceptualized as simply a kind of
civil regulation. Nonetheless, because the taxation cases take a strikingly
different approach to the importance of nonmember consent and reliance
interests, they require separate treatment.
E. Tribal Taxation of Nonmembers
Two years after Oliphant precluded tribal criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians and one year before Montana limited many aspects of tribal
civil regulation of nonmembers, Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the
Colville Indian Reservation24° upheld a tribal sales tax imposed on
nonmembers who entered the reservation to buy products. Legalistically,
the Court concluded that " [t]he power to tax transactions occurring on trust
lands and significantly involving a tribe or its members is a fundamental
attribute of sovereignty"' 24 that Congress had never abrogated, that the
federal government had assumed to be valid, and that was not "inconsistent
239. Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 421 (1994); see also supra text accompanying notes 112-
113.
240. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
241. Id. at 152.
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with the overriding interests of the National Government."-42 Thus, the
tribe could impose the tax despite its domestic dependent status.
Presumably, the Court found the case far afield from Oliphant-the
only implicit-divestiture case then on the books-because it is difficult to
perceive any risk of unfairness to nonmembers. Unlike in the diminishment
cases as well as in Oliphant and its progeny, where Congress had opened up
the reservation to nonmembers and thereby encouraged them to take
important actions based on their potentially reasonable reliance upon the
expectation of freedom from tribal regulation, in Confederated Tribes all
the nonmember had to do to avoid the tax was to decline to engage in the
transaction. A year later in Montana, the Court seemingly recognized this
factor when it cited Confederated Tribes in support of its exception to the
preclusion of tribal regulatory authority where nonmembers have
voluntarily entered into relationships with tribes. 43 That raises the question,
however, why over a decade later the Court in Bourland protected
nonmembers who could have avoided tribal regulation simply by not
hunting or fishing in the recreational area. Legalistically, the difference
could be that the transactions occurred on tribal trust land in Confederated
Tribes. Because the tribe had the authority to exclude nonmembers from
this land, it could condition their entry upon consent to pay a tax.
Unfortunately, this explanation does not make sense of another, more
important tribal taxation case.
In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,2 the tribe had entered into long-
term mineral leases under which nonmember companies extracted oil and
gas from tribal lands and paid the tribe a royalty. Many years later, the tribe
imposed a severance tax upon the extraction of these minerals. The leases
in question were silent concerning the imposition of tribal taxes. The
practical effect of the tax was to increase the tribe's, and to decrease the
companies', net revenue.245 Understandably, the companies challenged the
242. Id. at 153. The Court's explanation of why tribal taxation of nonmembers was consistent
with domestic dependent status was extraordinarily cursory:
Tribal powers are not implicitly divested by virtue of the tribes' dependent status. This
Court has found such a divestiture in cases where the exercise of tribal sovereignty
would be inconsistent with the overriding interests of the National Government, as
when the tribes seek to engage in foreign relations, alienate their lands to non-Indians
without federal consent, or prosecute non-Indians in tribal courts which do not accord
the full protections of the Bill of Rights. . . . In the present cases, we can see no
overriding federal interest that would necessarily be frustrated by tribal taxation....
Id. at 153-54 (citations omitted).
243. Recall that this "Montana exception" stated that "[a] tribe may regulate, through
taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual
relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other
arrangements." Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981) (citing, among other
cases, Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. at 152-54).
244. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
245. See id. at 167 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1999]
The Yale Law Journal
tax, which surely appeared to them to be a unilateral rewriting of the
original deal. Moreover, unlike the potential nonmember one-shot
purchasers in Confederated Tribes, the companies in Merrion had a long-
term contractual relationship with the tribe and had presumably sunk
significant costs into this project in reliance upon their understanding of the
original arrangement.
As in Confederated Tribes, Congress had not clearly precluded the tax
at issue in Merrion, and the tax did involve tribal trust lands. A huge
potential distinction existed, however: Because the tribe in Merrion had
entered into the leases, arguably it did not have the authority to exclude the
nonmember companies.246 Justice Marshall's majority opinion in Merrion
nonetheless upheld the tribal authority to tax, concluding that "there is a
significant territorial component to tribal power"2 47 and that "[t]he power to
tax is an essential attribute of Indian sovereignty because it is a necessary
instrument of self-government and territorial management."" Of course,
these premises would seem equally applicable to all the implicit-divestiture
cases, for surely criminal (Oliphant, Duro) and civil (Montana, Brendale,
Bourland) regulation is likewise "a necessary instrument of self-
government and territorial management."
Under Merrion, a tribe can tax a nonmember company with presumably
significant "justifiable expectations" to the contrary in a circumstance
where the tribe has agreed to allow the company on the reservation. Yet,
absent congressional authorization or clear nonmember consent, a tribe
cannot criminally sanction nonmember residents of the reservation
(Oliphant, Duro), cannot regulate nonmembers who hunt or fish on
nonmember fee lands unless their conduct threatens a core tribal interest
(Montana), might be able to zone some nonmember lands on the
reservation (Brendale), and yet cannot even regulate the hunting or fishing
of transient nonmembers who come to a federal recreational area within the
reservation (Bourland). Doctrinally, perhaps the best reconciliation of the
cases is that when Congress destroys the tribal power to exclude
nonmembers-as the Court understands the allotment statutes to have done
with respect to nonmember landowners-the congressional action should
246. In addition, because the tribe was the sole royalty holder, the oil companies could not
rely upon opposition to the tax from private royalty holders. See Frickey, supra note I 1, at 1171
n.193.
247. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 142.
248. Id. at 137. Justice Marshall also disposed of another argument, rooted in Oliphant, see
supra text accompanying notes 180-181, by concluding that the federal governmental branches
had assumed that tribes possess the power to tax nonmembers, see Merrion, 455 U.S. at 139-4 I.
In Merrion, the Court stressed that, pursuant to a requirement in the tribal constitution, the
Secretary of the Interior had approved the tribal tax before it took effect. See id. at 135-36, 141.
150 & n.16, 155. In a circumstance where no tribal or federal law required Secretarial approval of
such a tax, however, the Court found the tax to be within the tribe's inherent authority. See Kerr-
McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195 (1985).
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be broadly construed to immunize nonmembers from unilateral tribal
regulation. In contrast, in the absence of congressional intrusion upon tribal
sovereignty, the tribe may condition nonmember entry upon consent to
tribal regulation (Confederated Tribes), and tribal waiver of the power to
exclude, as an action in derogation of sovereignty, shall, according to
established canons of construction, be narrowly construed, such that the
tribe shall be held as not having lost it or other sovereign powers unless the
tribe has explicitly waived them as well (Merrion).249
One gets the sense, though, that such exercises in case-crunching hold
little hope for rationalizing for very long as unruly an area as federal Indian
law."s Every option seems fraught with normative and doctrinal dilemmas.
To take a final example, consider whether the Court should overrule
Merrion and simply view the tribal power to exclude as including the lesser
power of the tribe to admit nonmembers and subject them to civil
regulation. The normative unattractiveness of this option, which would
destroy one of the few remaining zones of vital tribal authority, should be
evident. Moreover, its contribution to doctrinal coherence would be
problematic, because even this partial reconstruction is in tension with the
final cluster of cases involving tribal attempts to regulate nonmembers. The
next Section turns to these cases. As with tribal taxation of nonmembers,
tribal-court jurisdiction over nonmember defendants began as a unique
category of civil regulation in which tribes possessed authority transcending
the grudging general regulatory power captured in the Montana exceptions.
Unlike tribal taxation, however, tribal-court civil jurisdiction over
nonmembers has been eroded by recent precedent.
F. Tribal-Court Jurisdiction in Civil Cases Involving
Nonmember Defendants
When the Supreme Court first considered whether a tribal court could
hear a civil case brought by a member against a nonmember defendant, it
had already decided Williams, Oliphant, Montana, and Merrion. These
cases suggested at least three options. First, the Court could equate tribal-
court criminal and civil jurisdiction by holding that non-Indians are just as
immune from defending civil cases in tribal court as Oliphant renders them
immune from defending criminal charges there. Many of the factors
249. This theory may not adequately explain Duro, which involved a nonmember Indian
criminal defendant living on an unallotted reservation (and thus one where Congress had not
expressly extinguished the tribe's authority to exclude a large category of nonmembers). The
Court in Duro, however, did leave open the question whether a tribe could obtain criminal
jurisdiction by consent of the nonmember defendant "in return for [the) tribe's agreement not to
exercise its power to exclude [the] offender from tribal lands." Duro v. Reina. 495 U.S. 676, 689
(1990).
250. So I have argued before. See Frickey, supra note 11, at 1767-68, 1775-80.
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supporting Oliphant-the supposed unfairness of subjecting non-Indians to
tribal court, where unique tribal laws and customs are followed and only
tribal members may be on the jury, all beyond the reach of the
Constitution"l-would seem applicable in the context of non-Indian civil
defendants as well. Yet such a flat prohibition would be in great tension
with Williams, which relegates a nonmember civil plaintiff to tribal court
when suing a member on a cause of action arising in Indian country.
Second, the Court could equate tribal-court civil jurisdiction with tribal
civil regulatory power by concluding that tribal-court jurisdiction over
nonmember civil defendants must satisfy one of the "Montana
exceptions.''  Again, this outcome would be in tension with Williams.
Third, the Court could conclude that, like taxation in Merrion, civil judicial
jurisdiction is a fundamental attribute of tribal sovereignty, the retention of
which is consistent with the shared assumptions of the federal governmental
branches. This outcome would, of course, be consistent with Williams, but
it would raise the question why tribal-court civil jurisdiction is privileged
while, under Montana, tribal-council civil regulatory authority is not.
In this jurisprudential land of ultimate incoherence-or at least in
which every case is distinguishable from what has come before-it is
perhaps not surprising that, at least at first, the Court followed none of these
options. 3 Instead, the Court attempted to construct an institutionally
sensitive approach to tribal-court jurisdiction in civil cases involving
nonmember defendants.
251. See supra note 182.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 219-221.
253. The Court did not, as it had done in Oliphant, disqualify tribal courts from hearing cases
against non-Indians, perhaps because, as Williams had suggested long before, civil cases raise
fewer civil liberties concerns than criminal cases. The Court did not even create, along the lines of
Montana, a rule against tribal adjudicatory power subject to exceptions. Perhaps the explanation
here is simply the distinction between tribal judicial jurisdiction, which was recognized over
nonmember plaintiffs in Williams, and the tribal regulatory jurisdiction looked upon with disfavor
in Montana. It is no secret that judges have often made more generous assumptions about the
likelihood of the legitimate exercise of authority by judges than by others possessing the coercive
power of government. Compare, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969)
(striking down an ordinance giving local officials complete discretion to issue parade permits as a
prior restraint upon expressive activity), with Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967)
(upholding an injunction incorporating such an unconstitutional prior restraint system). Yet
neither did the Court embrace Merrion-like essentialist notions of tribal sovereignty and return all
the way to Williams by assuming that nonmembers in tribal court have no cognizable complaints.
A potentially key distinction is that the nonmember oil companies in Merrion and the nonmember
merchant in Williams had voluntarily entered Indian country for commercial purposes and,
arguably, implicitly consented to take tribal laws and institutions as they found them. In contrast,
at least many potential nonmember civil defendants in cases arising in Indian country could be
fee-simple landowners (as in Montana and Brendale), residents (as in Oliphant), or others entitled
to enter the reservation for noncommercial purposes (as in Bourland) pursuant to explicit
congressional actions destroying the tribal authority to exclude nonmembers, which arguably
create "justifiable expectations" inconsistent with full tribal territorial sovereignty.
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In the first case, National Fanners Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow
Tribe,' the Court refused to provide a categorical answer to the question
whether a tribal court may exercise civil jurisdiction over a nonmember
defendant. It did hold that federal courts have federal-question jurisdiction
to hear challenges to tribal-court jurisdiction over nonmembers.s But the
Court then undercut the utility to nonmembers of this jurisdiction by
declining to expand the rationale of Oliphant to preclude tribal-court civil
jurisdiction over them. Oliphant was distinguishable because, although the
shared assumptions of the federal branches counseled against criminal
jurisdiction,256  they provided no clear answer concerning civil
jurisdiction.' 7 Thus, "the existence and extent of a tribal court's
jurisdiction will require a careful examination of tribal sovereignty, the
extent to which that sovereignty has been altered, divested, or diminished,
as well as a detailed study of relevant statutes, Executive Branch policy as
embodied in treaties and elsewhere, and administrative or judicial
decisions.""5 The Court concluded that the best institution to have front-
line responsibility for this inquiry was the tribal court itself.- 9
Two years later, in Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante,2° the Court
applied this exhaustion requirement to federal suits using diversity
jurisdiction to attack tribal-court jurisdiction. Iowa Mutual contained two
important elaborations upon National Farmers. First, it clarified that
nonmembers were required to exhaust all tribal-court remedies, including
appellate ones.26' Second, in a mind-bending passage, it seemed to invoke
Montana, which found no tribal civil regulatory power over nonmembers
254. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
255. See id. at 852-53.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 180-181.
257. Congress had provided federal criminal jurisdiction over the offense in Oliphant. but no
federal civil jurisdiction over the alleged tort in National Farmers. See National Farmers, 471
U.S. at 854. In addition, unlike the inconsistent federal executive understandings in Oliphant, see
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191. 199-201 (1978). an Attorney General opinion
had concluded that tribal courts at least sometimes had jurisdiction over a civil case with a
nonmember defendant, see National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 854-55.
258. National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 855-56 (footnote omitted).
259. The Court stated:
We believe that examination should be conducted in the first instance in the Tribal
Court itself. Our cases have often recognized that Congress is committed to a policy of
supporting tribal self-government and self-determination. That policy favors a rule that
will provide the forum whose jurisdiction is being challenged the first opportunity to
evaluate the factual and legal bases for the challenge. Moreover the orderly
administration of justice in the federal court will be served by allowing a full record to
be developed in the Tribal Court before either the merits or any question concerning
appropriate relief is addressed.... Exhaustion of tribal court remedies, moreover, will
encourage tribal courts to explain to the parties the precise basis for accepting
jurisdiction, and will also provide other courts with the benefit of their expertise in such
matters in the event of further judicial review.
Id. at 856-57 (footnotes omitted).
260. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
261. See id. at 16-17.
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except in exceptional circumstances,"' in support of a presumption favoring
tribal-court civil jurisdiction over nonmembers:
Tribal authority over the activities of non-Indians on reservation
lands is an important part of tribal sovereignty. . . . Civil
jurisdiction over such activities presumptively lies in the tribal
courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or
federal statute. "Because the Tribe retains all inherent attributes of
sovereignty that have not been divested by the Federal
Government, the proper inference from silence... is that the
sovereign power. . . remains intact." 
2 63
National Farmers held out the promise of a tribal-federal judicial
relationship under which tribal courts could flourish. 64 A puzzling problem
lurked just below the surface, however. The Court in National Farmers
never explained how requiring exhaustion of tribal-court remedies by
nonmember defendants in civil cases could be squared with Montana's
approach to tribal civil regulatory jurisdiction. The Court in National
Farmers did not specify whether, in the absence of a governing federal
treaty or statutory provision, tribal-court jurisdiction in these cases was
presumptively valid, presumptively invalid, or turned on some other
inquiry, such as whether the reservation context had retained a sufficiently
Indian character or whether the dispute in question implicated important
tribal interests. Absent such guidance, the Court left the legal community
with only a surmise: Presumably the exhaustion requirement was not
merely a charade-tribal courts must have valid jurisdiction over at least
many civil cases involving nonmember defendants, mustn't they? That
Iowa Mutual later stated that tribal courts presumptively have jurisdiction
over nonmember civil defendants made sense in light of the exhaustion
policy, but did nothing to resolve the tension between this approach and
Montana.
When, after a decade, the Court returned to the tension between
National Farmers and Montana, it took up the problem in the context of
facts that failed to illuminate the tribal interests at stake. Strate v. A-i
Contractors265 arose out of an automobile accident on a state highway
262. See supra text accompanying notes 219-221.
263. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 18 (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130.
149 n.14 (1982)). In addition to Montana, the Court cited Washington v. Confederated Tribes of
the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980), discussed supra text accompanying notes
240-243, which allowed tribes to impose a sales tax upon transient non-Indian purchasers of
goods in Indian country, and Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976), which precluded state-
court jurisdiction over adoption or custody proceedings concerning reservation-domiciled Indian
children.
264. See, e.g., FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND
CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LIFE 50, 57, 81, 93, 96-98, 194 (1995).
265. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
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running through an Indian reservation. A-I Contractors, a non-Indian
company, was performing road work on the reservation as a subcontractor
for a tribal corporation. An A-i gravel truck driven by a non-Indian
employee collided with a car driven by a non-Indian, Mrs. Fredericks, who
was married to a tribal member and who permanently resided on the
reservation. Her children (who were tribal members) and she brought suit
against A-1 in tribal court. After exhausting all tribal-court remedies, A-i
sought federal judicial relief from the suit. By this time, Mrs. Fredericks
stood alone as the plaintiff,' leaving (from the standpoint of tribal
interests) an unpalatable fact pattern in which all parties in the case were
non-Indian.
The division in the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, demonstrated the
plasticity of the precedents. The majority of the Eighth Circuit, which
denied tribal-court jurisdiction, considered Montana the controlling
precedent on the authority of tribal institutions, including courts, to regulate
nonmembers in civil matters. 7 For the majority, National Farmers was a
case about exhaustion of tribal remedies, not a decision that tribal courts
actually had jurisdiction over nonmember civil defendants.m The language
in Iowa Mutual indicating wide-ranging tribal-court jurisdiction over
nonmember civil defendants was narrowly understood as applying only to
those circumstances in which, under Montana, the tribe would have civil
regulatory jurisdiction as well.' Of course, the dissenters took the opposite
tack. Relying on the helpful language in Iowa Mutual, they concluded that
the tribal court presumptively had jurisdiction over civil suits arising within
reservation borders.270 Montana was narrowly construed as involving only
the implicit divestiture of tribal sovereignty over nonmember conduct on
nonmember fee lands, not nonmember conduct throughout the reservation
in general or even on portions of the reservation, like the state highway,
where the tribe had lost the ability to exclude nonmembers. "
The contesting blocs of the Eighth Circuit thus manipulated, but could
not resolve, the underlying tension between Montana and National
Farmers. The majority of the Eighth Circuit privileged Montana, thereby
identifying a unified approach to tribal authority over nonmembers at the
risk of transforming the exhaustion requirement of National Farmers and
Iowa Mutual into a pointless exercise-why require nonmember defendants
to exhaust remedies in courts that do not presumptively have jurisdiction
over them in the first place? The dissenting approach in the Eighth Circuit
266. See id. at 444 n.3.
267. See A-1 Contractors v. Strate, 76 F.3d 930, 934-35 (8th Cir. 1996).
268. See id. at 936.
269. See id. at 935-36.
270. See i at 946 (McMillian, J., dissenting).
271. See id. at 947.
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faced the opposite problem-if tribal courts presumptively have wide-
ranging jurisdiction over nonmember civil defendants, how can tribal
regulatory power over nonmembers be invalid in the absence of a
"Montana exception"? If a tribal court applied tribal law to a nonmember
civil defendant, would that not be an exercise of tribal regulatory authority?
When the case reached the Supreme Court, something had to give, and
it was not surprising what it was.272 Justice Ginsburg's unanimous opinion
in Strate generally followed the path of the majority of the Eighth Circuit,
treating Montana as the controlling precedent concerning tribal-court civil
authority over nonmembers.273 Ginsburg called the exhaustion requirement
of National Fanners a "prudential," not a jurisdictional, rule.274 The
contrary language in Iowa Mutual was drained of life by limiting it to
situations in which the tribe could claim regulatory authority over
nonmembers under Montana.275 The opinion waffled on a critical point,
however. To be sure, Ginsburg did not limit Montana to tribal regulatory
authority over nonmember fee lands. She did, however, equate the highway
right-of-way to such lands: As with the allotment process that created
nonmember fee lands, the tribe had consented to the creation of the right-
of-way and had been compensated for it, and the federal government had
granted the right-of-way to the state free from any reservation of sovereign
rights on behalf of the tribe. 76 Thus, Strate leaves open a variety of
questions about tribal-court jurisdiction and exhaustion of tribal-court
remedies concerning nonmember defendants where the cause of action
arises on a reservation site other than nonmember fee lands, state or federal
roads, or similar areas in which the federal government has explicitly
divested the tribe of property rights and the power to exclude
nonmembers.277
272. For a thorough doctrinal analysis suggesting that the Court should have overcome its
instincts to protect nonmembers and recognized tribal adjudicative authority broader than tribal
regulatory power, see Laurie Reynolds, "Jurisdiction" in Federal Indian Law: Confusion.
Contradiction, and Supreme Court Precedent, 27 N.M. L. REv. 359 (1997).
273. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 445.
274. Id. at 453.
275. See id.
276. See id. at 454-55.
277. Strate also surely leaves open the question whether a tribal court may exercise
jurisdiction over a civil case involving a member plaintiff and a nonmember defendant. See id. at
441 (narrowly defining the question in the case as one concerning tribal-court jurisdiction over a
civil suit arising out of an auto accident on a state highway between two nonmembers). But see
Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 813-14 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1516
(1998) (holding that a tribal court lacked jurisdiction over a case brought by a member against a
nonmember).
In its most recent decision, El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 119 S. Ct. 1430 (1999).
the Court continued its trend of depriving a tribal court of civil jurisdiction, but this time in a
much narrower setting than that in Strate. The case involved claims of injury resulting from
uranium mining operations. As the Court explained, in the Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2014
(1994), Congress expressed a clear preference that federal district courts resolve certain liability
claims related to the operations of the nuclear industry. Although Congress never expressly
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G. Conclusion
Whatever might be its ultimate reach, Strate continued a theme
recognized in Bourland (the Court's most recent civil regulatory case) and
Yankton (the Court's most recent reservation-diminishment case): When
Congress opened a reservation area to nonmember entry, that action had the
legal effect of presumptively immunizing nonmembers from tribal
authority. Regardless of how the opinions read, it no longer really matters
much how the statutory text reads. No longer is there a search for
congressional intent clearly preempting tribal power over nonmembers. The
reason that none of this matters is that the driving force in these cases is not
whether Congress has clearly divested tribes of sovereignty. It is now
sufficient that Congress intruded upon tribal sovereignty in ways that, the
current Court concludes, are inconsistent with tribal authority in light of the
practical circumstances and settled expectations of nonmembers.
It seems beyond question that, notwithstanding the plenary power of
Congress over Indian affairs and despite the canons of interpretation that
supposedly resolve open questions in favor of the tribes unless Congress
has spoken clearly to the contrary, the Court has accorded itself front-line
responsibility to handle current controversies in federal Indian law rather
than simply to freeze the legal status quo and await definitive congressional
resolution. What seems in significant doubt is how the Court's approach to
the field can be rendered explicable. On their own terms, the opinions
congeal into an incoherent muddle. Yet perhaps there are unarticulated or
only vaguely identified values that can lend some explanatory light to this
murky area. It is to this search for lurking factors that the next Part turns.
preempted tribal-court jurisdiction over such claims, the federal policy favoring a federal forum is
much clearer than that involving diversity jurisdiction and routine ton cases applied by analogy in
Sr'ate. Neztsosie also contains language reading Strate quite narrowly:
[Petitioners argue] that the Tribal Courts somehow lacked jurisdiction over Price-
Anderson claims because under [Strate] a tribal court has jurisdiction over a
nonmember only where the tribe has regulatory jurisdiction vith respect to the matter at
issue, and Congress has completely occupied the field of nuclear regulation. But Strate
dealt with claims against nonmembers arising on state highways, and -express[edl no
view on the governing law or proper forum when an accident occurs on a tribal road
within a reservation." By contrast, the events in question here occurred on tribal lands.
Neztsosie, 119 S. Ct. at 1436 n.4 (citations omitted).
1999]
The Yale Law Journal
V. DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: METHODOLOGICAL
RECONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF THE COURT'S OPINIONS CONCERNING
TRIBAL AUTHORITY OVER NONMEMBERS
A. Judicial Lawmaking in the Guise of Routine Statutory Interpretation
The most obvious methodological point about contemporary federal
Indian law is that, in the absence of targeted congressional guidance, the
Supreme Court stands ready to protect arguably significant nonmember
interests rather than to wait for Congress to address the problem. It does not
seem to make much difference whether, as in Oliphant, the Court
acknowledges that no authoritative text controls and that the Court is
engaged in federal common-lawmaking that divests tribes of inherent
sovereignty or whether, as in Yankton, the Court purports to rely upon
statutory or treaty text to diminish tribal interests. In both scenarios, the
Court reaches whatever result seems most practical in the current context.
The Court has, in effect, embraced a common law for our age of
colonialism.
A striking evolution in judicial methodology has occurred in order to
free the Court to pursue this mission. The canons of interpretation that once
seemed to influence strongly, if not control, outcomes in federal Indian law
cases278 have lost their force in the context of significant nonmember
interests.279 Yankton is only the most illuminating example of a process of
gradual degradation of the canons.80 Even six years ago, it seemed possible
to imagine a revival of the canons as a practical judicial strategy to force the
Court to maintain the status quo and thereby require Congress to do the
ugly work of implementing the ongoing processes of colonization.' It is
not too late to return to these conceptions of the appropriate judicial role,282
but that would require a judicial appreciation for the historical and
contemporary value of the canons,' an attitudinal shift that seems unlikely
to occur.
This unraveling of the canonical approach is profoundly important.
Quite often, the essential argumentative move in a statutory interpretation
case is finding a way in which textual silence works in your favor. Canons
of clear statement provide advocates with an excellent way of achieving
this argument-structuring and outcome-producing result. Advocates for
tribes have used this technique for years, contending that, under the Indian
278. See Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 30, at 617-20.
279. See Getches, supra note 22, at 1620-22.
280. See Frickey, supra note 22, at 418-26.
281. See id. at 437-39.
282. For a recent proposal, see Getches, supra note 22, at 1654-55.
283. For an attempt to make this case, see Frickey, supra note 22, at 406-40.
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law canons, silent or ambiguous statutory or treaty text must be interpreted
in favor of tribal interests, preserving the status quo and forcing opponents
of tribal interests to bear the burden of legislative inertia and persuade
Congress to override tribal interests expressly.' If, as Parts II and IV
suggest, those canons have lost their force in federal Indian law where
significant nonmember interests are at stake, the entire structure of dialogue
in the field has shifted, and along with it the key institutional
responsibilities.
In place of the canonical method, where only clear treaty or statutory
text or congressional intent may displace tribal interests, the Court in such
recent cases as Yankton, Strate, and Bourland took a more abstract
interpretive approach, under which general congressional purposes control
if they have worked their way sufficiently into the adjudicatory context.
During the oral argument in Strate, a Justice said that nonmembers who
stay on the good roads should be all right.? As both civil regulatory
precedents-Montana, Brendale, and Bourland, involving tribal power to
regulate nonmembers on non-Indian reservation lands-and diminishment
cases-Yankton and Hagen, involving reservation areas with largely non-
Indian demographics-suggest, the same point could be made about
nonmembers who find themselves in other "non-Indian" reservation areas.
Indeed, because there is always some text lurking in the background
somewhere-some treaty, some federal statute of potential relevance-this
new-found judicial freedom in interpretation seems to be merging with the
Court's longer-standing approach to the common-law aspects of federal
Indian law. For example, Oliphant, a case in which the Court did not
conceive of itself as interpreting authoritative text at all, might be profitably
reconceptualized. In light of just how loose "statutory interpretation" has
become in federal Indian law, it would not be difficult to redraft the
Oliphant opinion so that its rationale is one of statutory interpretation rather
than federal common-lawmaking. Using Bourland as a guide, the revised
opinion could conclude that the allotment statute in question, by opening
the reservation to nonmember fee owners, abrogating the tribal power to
exclude nonmembers, and resulting in a reservation overwhelmingly non-
Indian today, destroyed tribal territorial criminal jurisdiction. This
"interpretation" of the allotment statute would be as consistent with the
general congressional purposes associated with allotment as the treaty or
284. See, e.g., Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); see also Frickey. supra note 22,
at 429-32 (discussing Bryan).
285. "Just stay on the good roads; you've got nothing to worry about. Stay on the state
highways." United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, Strate v. A-I Contractors. 520 U.S.
438 (1997) (No. 95-1872), available in 1997 WL 10398. at *43; see also Phillip Allen White,
Comment, The Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine: "Just Stay on the Good Roads, and You've Got
Nothing to Worry About," 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 65. 65 n.* (1997) (attributing the comment to
Justice Scalia).
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statutory interpretations in Yankton, Bourland, and Strate are consistent
with general congressional purposes at work in those cases. If the
seemingly bulletproof savings clause in Yankton is not enough to produce a
contrary conclusion, then statutory or treaty silence on the key questions-
as in Oliphant, Bourland, and Strate-should be no barrier at all. Ironically,
an advantage of this rewriting of Oliphant from the tribal perspective is that
it would not apply to unallotted reservations, such as the Navajo, where the
area retains a solid "Indian character."
The apparent merger of statutory interpretation and common-
lawmaking in these cases is highlighted by the role played by developments
subsequent to the allotment of the reservation. In the reservation-
diminishment cases, the Court has admitted that, in "interpreting" the
allotment agreement or statute in question, it takes into account
postenactment factors such as contemporary demographics and
jurisdictional patterns that have arisen over time.2"6 This approach makes no
sense if the interpretive touchstone of the agreement or statute in question is
plain textual meaning (there is none), specific congressional intent about
reservation boundaries (there is none), or original general congressional
purposes (which are always assimilative, such that adhering to them would
require that the tribes always lose, which they have not). This approach
does become understandable, however, if we conceptualize the judicial role
in these cases to be achieving a common-law-like resolution of a current
dispute based on current context.287
At first glance, the Court's sensitivity to current context might seem to
be a pragmatic interpretive effort defensible under William Eskridge's
theory of "dynamic statutory interpretation., 28 ' To be sure, Eskridge has
demonstrated both a positive case for dynamic interpretation-that judicial
understandings of statutory meaning have sometimes evolved in light of
changed circumstances unforeseen by the enacting legislature289-and a
normative case as well-that such interpretation is sometimes consistent
286. See supra text accompanying notes 92-106, 112-113, 116-118, 126.
287. In the two principal inherent-sovereignty cases that still constitute victories for tribal
sovereignty, Williams and Merrion, the reservations in question had never been allotted. Oliphant.
the first modern case concluding that tribal sovereignty was inconsistent with domestic dependent
nation status, involved a reservation that had been essentially destroyed by allotment. Once
Oliphant decided that tribes lack inherent sovereignty to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians, however, it became irresistible in Duro to extend that rationale to protect nonmember
Indians as well, even though the reservation in Duro had never been allotted. Perhaps in light of
this fact, the Court in Duro did note the tribe's general power to exclude nonmembers, see Duro v.
Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 696 (1990), which does not apply to nonmember fee owners on allotted
reservations, see Brendale v. Confederated Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408. 422
(1989) (opinion of White, J.); id. at 436 (opinion of Stevens, J.). The Duro Court did not reach the
question whether a tribe could condition permission to enter the reservation upon agreement to be
subject to tribal authority. See Duro, 495 U.S. at 689; supra note 249.
288. See generally ESKRIDGE, supra note 129.
289. See id. at 9-105.
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with fundamental liberal, legal-process, and more openly normativist
theories290 For both descriptive and normative reasons, however, the
Court's interpretive approach to federal Indian law is hard to defend within
this framework.
First, the contrast between what the Court says controls-when, as in
Yankton, it pretends that it is simply deferring to clear congressional
intent29 -and the postenactment factors that actually are outcome-
determinative in these cases destroys all candor, an essential element for the
assessment of dynamic interpretation. I would join Eskridge' in asserting
that the most defensible understanding of statutory interpretation, both
positively and normatively, is a kind of critical pragmatism: one that
attempts to construct practical outcomes in specific cases that resonate with
the "complex web of social and legal practices"" found in the legal
interpretive community while, simultaneously, critically reevaluating the
elements of the web rather than simply deferring to the conventional
wisdom.2' If the Court were to admit forthrightly that it was engaged in a
similar enterprise in the diminishment cases, it would first be compelled to
identify the values actually at work-primarily, the protection of the
supposed reliance interests of non-Indians. It would then be required to
consider the complex interpretive questions surrounding those interests,
which would entail admitting that statutory text provides no guidance, that
no original congressional intent on reservation borders existed, that the
original congressional purposes of assimilation are obsolete, and that
current federal policy favors tribal sovereignty.? The Court would next be
required to admit that changed circumstances have radically overthrown the
allotment regime, leaving both tribes and non-Indians in disarray. The
critical aspect of this kind of pragmatism would question whether Holmes's
aphorism about "the prejudices judges share with their fellow [citizens]"
provides a better explanation than any legalistic theory for the Court's
privileging of the reliance interests of non-Indians over the interests of the
tribes in preserving the remnants of reservations fractured by Congress's
broken treaty promises.296
290. See id at 107-204.
291. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
292. And I have, more or less, in Eskridge & Frickey. supra note 127. as well as in WILLIAM
N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES
AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (2d ed. 1995).
293. ESKRIDGE, supra note 129, at 201.
294. See id. at 199-204.
295. These factors track the elements of a diagram for pragmatic statutory interpretation that
Eskridge and I developed in Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 127, at 345-62.
296. A journalist recently made the point this way:
The Lakotas were the victims of nineteenth-century social engineering that decimated
their reservation. But the adventurous emigrants from Oslo and Odessa were also the
victims of a terrible historical prank, the trick of the disappearing and now magically
reappearing reservation. Their grandchildren are today discovering themselves in a
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Any suggestion that the Court has failed to appreciate the dynamic
quality of its Indian law seems easily pushed aside by the startling contrast
between two pronouncements of Justice Scalia. In his recently published
Tanner Lectures, after first criticizing judicial reliance upon "unexpressed
legislative intent" as "nothing but an invitation to judicial lawmaking," 297
Justice Scalia noted that "[t]here are more sophisticated routes to judicial
lawmaking than reliance upon unexpressed legislative intent, but they will
not often be found in judicial opinions because they are too obvious a
usurpation." 298 He then referred to Eskridge's theory of dynamic statutory
interpretation as a "modern and forthright approach to according courts the
power to revise statutes ' 299 so that "[t]he law means what it ought to
mean." 300
Compare these comments to a remarkable memorandum found in the
papers of Justice Marshall. It turns out that in Duro, Justice Scalia was
strange new political world that was not of their making, hungry for protection and
obliged to learn the new and difficult language of tribal power. It is a rhetoric that,
reasonably enough, demands for tribes a degree of self-government that is taken for
granted by other Americans; it also asks non-Indians to live under tribal taxation,
police, and courts of sometimes dubious reliability.
BORDEWICH, supra note 6, at 328. Contrast the views of a legal scholar:
No treaty promises were made to non-Indian settlers in the Indian country. At most, the
federal government invited non-Indians into the Indian country with the understanding
that eventually the Indians would assimilate and the tribes would disappear. That
expectation may have created a form of psychological reliance, but it should have
created no legal reliance interests....
But if the federal government made no promises to non-Indian settlers that could
have ripened into vested rights, the government most assuredly did make those
promises to the tribes [in treaties that were subsequently unilaterally abrogated through
allotment].
Royster, supra note 68, at 71-72. Royster found no logic in the argument "that the government
should now keep its 'promise' to the settlers, but not its promise to the tribes." Id. at 72.
For the reasons briefly sketched infra note 369, I would side with Royster, despite having
more sympathy for the non-Indian position than she articulates, rather than with Bordewich, who
may be guilty of overvaluing "melting pot" notions of social homogeneity. See BORDEWICII.
supra note 6, at 329 (implausibly suggesting that retaining tribal sovereignty amounts to
"legitimizing segregation for Indians[, which] will set a precedent for its potential imposition
upon black, Asian, and Hispanic Americans"). Whichever way one comes out, however, it is
striking that the Court has never engaged in anything approaching this sort of candid
acknowledgment of the important factors.
297. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
21 (1997). Lest I be accused of Scalia-bashing in the discussion that follows in the text, allow me
to note my concurrence in Eskridge's critical but respectful review of this book. See William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509 (1998). Justice Scalia's
willingness to engage in candid theoretical and practical debate about statutory interpretation has
been the single greatest blast of fresh air in a field that had long lain dormant to considered
intellectual reevaluation. See Philip P. Frickey, Revisiting the Revival of Theory in Statutory
Interpretation: A Lecture in Honor of Irving Younger, 84 MINN. L. REV. - (forthcoming 1999)
(assessing Justice Scalia's impact upon statutory interpretation).
298. SCALIA, supra note 297, at 21 (discussing the theory of judicial statutory revision in light
of common-law evolution proposed in GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF
STATUTES (1982)).
299. Id. at 22.
300. Id.
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inclined to join Justices Brennan and Marshall in dissenting from the
majority's rejection of tribal-court criminal jurisdiction over nonmember
Indians. Upon examining recent precedents with an eye toward writing the
dissent that Brennan had assigned to him, however, Scalia changed his
mind. He explained his reasoning to Brennan:
[O]ur opinions in this field have not posited an original state of
affairs that can subsequently be altered only by explicit legislation,
but have rather sought to discern what the current state of affairs
ought to be by taking into account all legislation, and the
congressional "expectations" that it reflects, down to the present
day.30
1
Justice Scalia has several things exactly right. As his memorandum
recognizes, the opinions in federal Indian law represent dynamic
interpretation to the core. As he stated in his Tanner Lectures, presumably
the opinions fail to acknowledge the dynamism because, in the eyes of
many, it would be "too obvious a usurpation."
How could Justice Scalia embrace in federal Indian law precisely the
sort of judicial revisionary power he later condemned in these lectures? In
his memorandum to Justice Brennan, he explained that "I would not have
taken that approach as an original matter, but it seems too deeply imbedded
in our jurisprudence to be changed at this stage." 'n Of course, he has not
wavered in his attacks upon other "deeply imbedded" notions inconsistent
with his jurisprudence, such as evolutive constitutional interpretation' and
the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation.' It seems
inescapable that the reason is that federal Indian law is not worth the
bother." 5 But at least Scalia deserves credit for understanding the conflict
between his jurisprudential scheme and the interpretive practices of his
colleagues and for initially voting for the former despite the siren call, so
alluring to other Justices, of protecting non-Indian interests.
301. Memorandum from Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice William J. Brennan. Jr. Regarding
Duro v. Reina (Apr. 4, 1990) (available in The Papers of Thurgood Marshall, Library of
Congress) (emphasis added). David Getches uncovered this memorandum and discussed it in
Getches, supra note 22, at 1575. 1 thank him for a copy of it.
302. Memorandum from Justice Scalia to Justice Brennan, supra note 301.
303. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia. J., dissenting)
(" [This most illiberal Court... has embarked on a course of inscribing one after another of the
current preferences of the society... into our Basic Law.").
304. See, e.g., Bank One Chicago v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co.. 516 U.S. 264, 279 (1996)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). For remarkable examples, see Le.xecon. Inc. v.
Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 28 n.t (1998) (noting that Justice Scalia
refused to join the portion of the opinion stating why the other Justices rejected a legislative-
history argument); and Associates Commercial Corp. %,. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 955 n.0 (1997)
(same).
305. Cf. Frickey, supra note 22, at 383 (noting reported remarks from Justices about how
federal Indian law disputes are "peewee" cases, even " chickenshit cases").
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If the Court's dynamism cannot be excused on the ground that it has
been inadvertent, it can only be defended on the basis of the values that it
promotes. At bottom, federal Indian law cases involving potential tribal
authority over nonmembers pose a stark conflict among liberal values of
personal autonomy and private property (protecting nonmember reliance
interests; protecting that measure of inherent authority and territory of tribes
that has not heretofore been involuntarily displaced by the colonial process)
and among more communal values as well (the cross-cutting communal
notions of nonmembers and members; the dilemma of creating a
constitutional order based on social-contract theory through a colonial
process displacing indigenous peoples). The Court's choices of values to be
privileged fly in the face of institutional values-an established canonical
interpretive regime dating back to the Marshall Court, which would require
Congress, not the Court, to take express action before further diminishment
of Indian interests is given legally cognizable effect. The Court has failed to
acknowledge its remarkable dynamism, much less to include any critical
element in it by testing whether the values that it privileges can withstand
normative reassessment under the sort of "play of intelligence" that my
colleague Daniel Farber has noted is the hallmark of balanced pragmatic
legal analysis. 6 For even if, as Eskridge suggests, critical dynamism in the
pursuit of virtue is no vice, uncritical dynamism in the pursuit of the
visceral is no virtue.
B. Bringing the Constitution to Indian Country
Of course, postenactment factors can involve legal as well as contextual
evolution. In the more overtly common-law mode it used in Oliphant and
Duro, the Court acknowledged that it was attempting to harmonize the legal
as well as the contextual landscape. Oliphant stressed the expanding
protections of civil liberties over time3" and the felt necessity of protecting
"outsiders" against criminal prosecution by narrow entities that have
306. See Daniel Farber, Missing the "Play of Intelligence," 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 147
(1994). Farber, in turn, relied upon the advice of our late colleague, Irving Younger. concerning
effective legal writing:
You must see through and around your subject, measuring it by more than one
measuring stick, turning it over, testing it, arriving at a just and clear-headed
assessment of its position in the hierarchy of things.
The word that best expresses this requisite distance is "detachment," understood
as a certain amusement with the enterprise upon which you are engaged, a sense of
humor about yourself and your works. If a lawyer has it, the lawyer's writing will
unfailingly communicate the play of intelligence ("play" here being as important as
"intelligence").
Id. at 166 (quoting Irving Younger, Let's Get Serious, A.B.A. J., May 1, 1987, at 110).
307. See supra note 210.
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unique laws and uncommon procedures.' Duro emphasized that, since
1924, Native Americans have been citizens of the United States and
presumably deserve the same protections of individual liberty generally
available against governmental power and specifically extended to non-
Indians as against tribal criminal authority in Oliphant.09 Indeed, Duro's
citation to Reid v. Covert10 was a dramatic reference to evolving
constitutional law that applies the Constitution to novel and narrowly
defined governmental institutions.
In my judgment, what the Court has done-without any conscious
reflection in its opinions-is to use federal common law to "quasi-
constitutionalize"' the relationship between tribes and nonmembers. This
explains why the Court can pick and choose between members and
nonmembers with respect to immunity from tribal regulation, rather than
impose uniform limitations upon tribal action benefiting members and
nonmembers alike.
It is obvious that the Court has found it increasingly incongruous that
tribes, as entities within the borders of the United States subject to ultimate
congressional control, may use the coercive power of government against
nonmembers without being subject to all of the basic constitutional
limitations and remedies. This incongruity has been heightened because in
most of the cases the tribe has struggled to regulate such persons in
circumstances in which Congress long ago destroyed the tribe's ability to
exclude nonmembers and in which the region in question may have, to
Anglo judicial eyes, lost its "Indian character." At least in such
surroundings, tribal sovereignty might appear to be one of Holmes's
accidental relics of history, and judicial intervention to protect nonmembers
might seem to be required as an appropriate felt necessity in a society based
on the fundamental rule of law encapsulated in constitutional values.
To be sure, the Indian Civil Rights Act does limit tribal authority over
all persons, including nonmembers. But, as Oliphant and Duro stressed,
the statute falls short of imposing all basic constitutional protections and
remedies upon tribes, and tribes retain the authority to use all-member
juries. As Duro indicated, a tribal member has the protection associated
308. See supra note 182.
309. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 692-96 (1990).
310. See supra text accompanying notes 203-213.
311. By this I mean that the Court is implementing constitutional values not by imposing the
Constitution directly upon the tribes, but instead by treating those values as premises for federal
common-lawmaking. The Court has used a similar technique in implementing the values of
separation of powers and federalism indirectly, through clear-statement rules of statutory
interpretation that cabin congressional intrusions upon these values, rather than by invalidating
federal legislation as unconstitutional. See William N. Eskridge. Jr. & Philip P. Frickey. Quasi-
Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L REV. 593
(1992).
312. See supra note 182 and text accompanying notes 208-209.
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with the right to vote in tribal elections and in any event may, by consent,
buy into this scheme, but nonmembers without voting rights may have no
apparent nonjudicial protections available." 3
The Court's difficulty in harmonizing basic American values with tribal
power is reminiscent of its struggles to expand the scope of the Constitution
in other areas. It seems similar in impulse to the incorporation doctrine,
whereby the Court, without any firm constitutional textual or historical
hook, applied the most important provisions of the Bill of Rights to the
states by way of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 4
An even more striking example is the "reverse incorporation" doctrine
arising from Boling v. Sharpe, t5 in which the Court concluded that the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause contains an implied equal
protection limitation against federal action. In both incorporation and
reverse incorporation, the Court essentially took it upon itself to complete
an incomplete Constitution, one that did not clearly establish a baseline of
nationally uniform protections against state governments and that failed
expressly to limit federal action classifying persons on sensitive personal
criteria such as race. Similarly, as Duro recognized by citing Reid v. Covert,
the Court has struggled with whether the Constitution applies to federal
action in foreign domains and to narrow institutions with unique authority
over their members, such as the military (and now tribes).
Much in the pattern of federal Indian law precedents is analogous to
these developments. Perhaps the most obvious is the implicit methodology
of balancing. The incorporation doctrine began by imposing upon the states
only those values "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."3 6 Similarly,
when confronted with the question whether the Constitution "follows the
flag" and applies outside the borders of the United States, the Court
initially concluded that in unincorporated territories only fundamental
protections of the Constitution attached to limit congressional power." 7 The
Indian law cases have used a similar weighing process to conclude that
tribal authority vis-i-vis nonmembers is prohibited for criminal jurisdiction,
313. See supra text accompanying notes 200-201.
314. On the incorporation doctrine, see, for example, Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation
Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253 (1982).
315. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
316. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). The standard has evolved such that
today the question is whether the right is "fundamental to the American scheme of justice."
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
317. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901). For a helpful overview, see NEUMAN.
supra note 204, at 4-5, 85-89. Although Downes and the other Insular Cases have never been
overruled, their precedential value was undercut by Reid v. Covert, the case cited in Duro, see
supra text accompanying notes 203-213, as suggesting limits even upon congressional
authorization of tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers. On the effect of Reid on the Insular
Cases, see NEUMAN, supra note 204, at 5, 89-94, 101, 106.
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authorized for taxation, invalid for civil regulation except in specified
circumstances, and unsettled for judicial jurisdiction in civil cases.
Other aspects of the federal Indian law cases do not fit the broader
pattern of public-law evolution, however. The Court has never questioned
Talton v. Mayes, which for a century has stood for the proposition that
tribal action is not subject to the Constitution. 8 Moreover, Oliphant and
Duro do not impose limits upon a tribe's regulation of its own members.319
In contrast, the incorporation doctrine protects both state residents and out-
of-staters from abuses of state authority.
It also seems clear that the Court has retained the option of deferring to
any responsive congressional action that disagrees with its precedents
protecting nonmembers. Indeed, it expressly stated in Oliphant that
Congress could authorize tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians.32 Thus, when Congress acted upon this suggestion by passing
legislation overturning the result in Duro by recognizing inherent tribal
authority to prosecute nonmember Indians, '-2 it acted within its authority to
control the allocation of sovereignty in Indian country?" In contrast, of
318. See supra text accompanying notes 45-47, 208.
319. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990) ("The retained sovereignty of the tribe is
but a recognition of certain additional authority the tribes maintain over Indians who consent to be
tribal members.").
320. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978) ("By submitting to
the overriding sovereignty of the United States, Indian tribes therefore necessarily give up their
power to try non-Indian citizens of the United States except in a manner acceptable to
Congress."); idL at 212 (stating that various policy considerations arguably supporting tribal
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians are "for Congress to weigh in deciding whether Indian
tribes should finally be authorized to try non-Indians").
321. In 1990, Congress authorized tribal courts to exercise criminal jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians for a one-year period. It did so by amending the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25
U.S.C. § 1301(2), changing the definition of "powers of self-government" to mean: "the inherent
power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all
Indians." Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-511. § 8077(b), 104 Stat. 1856, 1892. This
approach was made permanent in 1991. See Act of Oct. 28. 1991. Pub. L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat.
646.
322. Despite Duro's reference to Reid v. Covert, see supra text accompanying notes 203-213,
I am unaware of any court that has struck down the " Duro fix" as beyond congressional power.
Cf. Means v. Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court, 154 F.3d 941, 946 n.7 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting this
concern). For contrasting commentaries on the constitutionality and appropriateness of the Duro
fix, see Gould, supra note 73; Nell Jessup Newton, Permanent Legislation to Correct Duro v.
Reina, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 109 (1992); and Alex Tallchief Skibine, Duro v. Reina and the
Legislation that Overturned It: A Power Play of Constitutional Dimensions, 66 S. CAL L REV.
767 (1993).
A recent Eighth Circuit panel decision seriously misunderstood the source of the tribal
power exercised when a nonmember Indian is prosecuted. In United States v. Weaselhead, 156
F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 1998), district court judgment reinstated by equally divided en banc court per
curiam, 165 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed, U.S. Apr. 29, 1999 (No. 98-9211),
the district court had held that double jeopardy did not bar the federal prosecution of a
nonmember Indian for a crime on a reservation for which he had already been tribally prosecuted.
A majority of the Eighth Circuit panel disagreed. The panel reasoned that tribal criminal
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians pursuant to the Duro fix resulted from delegated federal
authority, not inherent tribal sovereignty, and thus the defendant had already been prosecuted once
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course, incorporation and reverse incorporation impose limits on state and
federal power that cannot be overturned by mere legislation.
Accordingly, what the Court has done in Oliphant and its progeny is
not perfectly analogous to the incorporation doctrine, the reverse
incorporation doctrine, or cases such as Reid v. Covert. To be sure, these
precedents capture much of the apparent judicial impetus to harmonize the
constitutional landscape and complete an incomplete Constitution, but they
are not alone on the list of constitutional doctrines that do so. In my
judgment, a closer analogy lies with the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine.323
At the outset, it is important to state the limits of this analogical effort.
The Court has never even recognized that Oliphant and its progeny share
some similarities with the dormant Commerce Clause approach, much less
attempted to legitimate the former by reference to the latter. Moreover, as
explained below, that approach would be a particularly inapt one to
by the same sovereign that sought to subject him to criminal penalty again. See id. at 824. The
panel recognized that in the Duro fix Congress intended to recognize inherent tribal authority
rather than to delegate new federal authority. See id. at 823. The panel concluded, however, that it
was the judicial, not the congressional, role to establish the baseline of tribal sovereignty, and that
any congressional modification of the baseline enhancing tribal authority amounted to a
delegation of federal power. See id. at 824. In dissent, Judge Morris Arnold understood that
Oliphant and Duro were merely federal common-law decisions subject to congressional revision.
See id. at 825 (M. Arnold, J., dissenting).
Judge Arnold was clearly correct, as a brief example should demonstrate. Suppose that the
federal courts conclude that a state regulation of semitrailer truck length unduly burdens interstate
commerce and declare the state law invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine-
which, although a constitutionally rooted rule, is actually best understood as an aspect of federal
common law. See infra text accompanying notes 326-327. Then suppose that Congress enacts
legislation authorizing states to regulate the length of such trucks. Surely when the state resumes
truck-length regulation, it is exercising its inherent police power-which always existed, even
though for a time it was preempted by federal common law-rather than some peculiar delegated
federal authority. The effect of the congressional authorizing legislation was to destroy the
preemptive barrier of federal common law-thereby allowing the always-existing-but-once-
preempted local police power to spring back free from judicial interference-not to delegate
special federal power to the state.
This is the way that we understand federal preemption of the local police power. It should
also be the way that we evaluate the Duro fix. Before European discovery of this continent, tribes
had the local police power. The federal common-law decision in Duro preempted that police
power over nonmember Indians; the Duro fix simply lifted the federal common-law preemption
from the tribe's police power. The prosecution of nonmember Indians is now, and always has
been, an exercise of inherent tribal authority-it was just that, for a time, this authority wits
preempted by federal common law. Accordingly, when the tribe first prosecutes a nonmember
Indian and then the federal government prosecutes that defendant on the same set of facts, there is
no double jeopardy problem because the prosecutions are accomplished by different sovereigns.
Cf United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (holding that tribal prosecution of a member is
pursuant to inherent tribal authority, so that later prosecution by the United States for the same
offense does not offend double jeopardy).
323. For discussions of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, see, for example, Lisa
Heinzerling, The Commercial Constitution, 1995 SuP. CT. REV. 217; Michael A. Lawrence,
Toward a More Coherent Dormant Commerce Clause: A Proposed Unitary Framework, 21
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 395 (1998); and Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant
Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DuKE L.J. 569.
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embrace in Indian law. These similarities in form but dissimilarities in
substance suggest that the judicial impulse in Indian law is attributable
more to an unreflective drift toward more familiar public-law techniques
than to a careful attempt to justify doctrinal evolution by sound analogical
reasoning or other defensible methods.
The dormant Commerce Clause cases are familiar terrain. As every
constitutional law student learns, there is no constitutional text that
prohibits states from burdening interstate commerce in ways that favor local
interests. Of course, Congress has the authority, pursuant to the Commerce
Clause, to outlaw such nationally counterproductive state regulation. But
instead of understanding this grant of congressional power and this absence
of any limitation upon state power as according Congress all front-line
federal responsibility concerning free national markets, the Court has, for a
century and a half, assumed its own role.324 It has viewed the delegation of
authority to Congress to regulate interstate commerce as expressing such a
firm constitutional policy favoring free national markets that a rebuttable
presumption exists against allowing states to burden interstate commerce
unduly even in the absence of congressional regulation."
In light of the lack of constitutional textual support for these
developments, the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, like incorporation
and reverse incorporation, amounts to judicial improvement of an
incomplete Constitution. In essence, the Court has inferred, from a grant of
congressional power, an implied, judicially enforceable limitation upon
state power. Because this limitation is premised upon a presumption
concerning congressional wishes rather than upon any constitutional
provision or doctrine (such as incorporation) outlawing such state action,
however, judicial decisions enforcing the doctrine have the quality of
federal common law rather than constitutional law-they are merely
suspensive vetoes of such implicitly preempted state acts, leaving it open to
Congress to authorize the states to proceed again along the formerly
judicially disapproved lines.Y
In many respects, the dormant Commerce Clause methodology seems
analogous to the implicit-divestiture approach of Oliphant and its progeny.
Both use the suspensive-veto technique of preserving ultimate
congressional responsibility over the subject matter. Moreover, the Indian
law cases, like the dormant Commerce Clause cases, seem premised on an
324. See, e.g., Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298 (1851).
325. See Lawrence, supra note 323, at 411-12.
326. See, e.g., In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891); LAURENcE H. TRIBE. AMERIcAN
CONSTrrTTIONAL LAW § 6-2, at 403-04 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that because the dormant
Commerce Clause cases are "negative judicial inferences from a constitutional grant of power to
Congress, the Supreme Court's doctrinal limitations on state interference are always subject to
congressional revision").
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assumed congressional intent surrounding a constitutional grant of
congressional power.3 7
The only constitutional grant of power expressly concerning Indian
affairs is the Indian Commerce Clause, providing that Congress may
"regulate commerce... with the Indian Tribes."3 ' In light of the
narrowness of this text, it is something of a legalistic mystery how
Congress ended up with "plenary power" over Indian affairs.329 But despite
the rejection of the notion in an earlier case,33 the Court has stated that "the
central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress
with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs." "'
Note the similarity between the judicially ascribed power of Congress
over Indian affairs and that over interstate commerce: Both are
"plenary." '332 Both fields also overlap with the local police power. The
Supreme Court long ago abandoned the notion that, once an activity was
considered to be in interstate commerce, state power over it was absolutely
forbidden even in the absence of preempting federal statutes.333 Instead, the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine provides that, in the absence of federal
preemption or approval, state regulation of interstate commerce is generally
upheld unless it facially discriminates against interstate commerce, is
motivated by protectionist purposes, or unduly burdens interstate
commerce. 33 The basic idea is that, although states often have legitimate
interests in regulating matters connected to interstate commerce, state
regulation nonetheless requires first-line federal judicial supervision
because of the incentives that states have to favor local interests at the
expense of outsiders in particular and of national commerce in general."'
327. Because Oliphant expressly stated that Congress could overturn its result by legislation,
an occasional commentator has briefly noted the similarity between the suspensive veto adopted
in that case and the Court's dormant Commerce Clause doctrines. See, e.g., Philip S. Deloria &
Nell Jessup Newton, The Criminal Jurisdiction of Tribal Courts over Non-Member Indians: An
Examination of the Basic Framework of Inherent Tribal Sovereignty Before and After Duro v.
Reina, 38 FED. B. NEWS & J. 70, 74 (1991); Karl J. Kramer, Comment, The Most Dangerous
Branch: An Institutional Approach to Understanding the Role of the Judiciary in American Indian
Jurisdictional Determinations, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 989, 998-99.
328. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
329. See Frickey, supra note 23, at 35-36. As explained there, congressional plenary power is
no mystery to the legal realist: Legislative power to conduct colonization is an essential attribute
of any colonial society, and it is far more efficient to centralize that power in the Congress than to
disperse it among the states. See id. at 52-74.
330. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378-79 (1886) (holding that the Indian
Commerce Clause cannot justify federal legislation regulating noncommercial intratribal affairs).
331. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989).
332. As to interstate commerce, this notion has solid judicial recognition all the way back to
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196-97 (1824).
333. See, e.g., Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298, 320 (1851).
334. This summary is similar to the "Unitary Framework" of Lawrence, supra note 323, at
416-17.
335. See, e.g., South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177. 184 n.2
(1938); TRIBE, supra note 326, § 6-5, at 409-10.
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The judicially understood conception of the Interstate Commerce Clause is,
thus, not simply a grant of "plenary" power to Congress over interstate
commerce, but a constitutionally recognized and judicially cognizable
policy favoring national free trade even in the absence of congressional
action pursuant to the clause. The purpose is to protect outsiders against
illegitimate local interference. The premise is that state boundary lines are
in most instances irrelevant to rational regulation of presumptively free
economic markets. If the Court guesses wrong about congressional wishes
when it invalidates a particular state regulation of interstate commerce,
Congress may of course enact legislation overturning the judicial result-
thus perhaps allaying concerns about judicial activism expanding an
express grant of congressional authority into an unwritten source of judicial
power.
Similarly, although the plenary power doctrine in federal Indian law
authorizes Congress to regulate even the most local of tribal affairs on the
reservation,336 the backdrop of unexercised congressional power is not
understood to preempt tribal authority automatically, for otherwise tribal
sovereignty would have vanished completely.337 But at least since Oliphant,
it has been clear that tribal authority may be preempted by judicially
articulated federal policy even in the absence of any congressional exercise
of its plenary power. Like the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, this
"dormant plenary power impulse" provides first-line, searching federal
judicial scrutiny to evaluate whether tribes have legitimate local interests
implemented by appropriate lawmaking and law-applying procedures and
institutions that transcend the interests of outsiders to be free from tribal
authority. The implicit assumption seems to be that the judicially
constructed doctrine of congressional plenary power over Indian affairs not
only accords Congress a police power in Indian country, but that it also
represents a national policy that, in the absence of congressional action,
there is a presumption that Indian reservation boundaries are irrelevant to
rational, nondiscriminatory regulation of insiders and outsiders. Because
this policy amounts to a presumption about unenacted congressional intent
rather than a constitutional command, Congress may overturn federal
judicial invalidation of tribal regulation of nonmembers, as it has done in
rejecting Duro by enacting legislation authorizing tribes to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.
336. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886) (upholding a federal statute
prohibiting intratribal crimes). The Supreme Court has never invalidated federal legislation on the
theory that it unduly invaded tribal affairs. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
337. Cf. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 328-29 (1978) (holding that a tribe retains
inherent sovereignty to prosecute a member even though Congress had also made the conduct a
federal crime).
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The analogy to the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine thus illuminates
what the Court has been doing unreflectively in the implicit-divestiture
cases. The analogy fits Montana well, for there the Court struck down a
facially discriminatory tribal rule forbidding only nonmembers from
hunting or fishing throughout the reservation. It takes a bit more work to
make sense of Oliphant and Duro, for there the tribe was only seeking to
subject outsiders to the same tribal laws and institutions that applied to
insiders. Apparently, the Court concluded that such facially even-handed
regulation nonetheless unduly burdened nonmember interests. In the typical
scenario involving facially neutral and generally applicable economic
regulation, it is presumed that the interests of out-of-state entities burdened
by the regulation are virtually represented in the state political process by
similarly situated in-state regulated entities.33 In Oliphant and Duro, the
Court apparently did not view nonmembers as similarly situated to
members, in light of the unique tribal laws and institutions in place,
especially the presence of an all-member jury.339
The dormant plenary power impulse is a striking example of judicial
activism against the backdrop of wide-ranging congressional power. As
with the judicial invasion of the local police power under the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine, the implication of judicially enforceable limits
on tribal authority based solely upon a grant of congressional power over
the subject matter is a kind of bootstrapping. But the dormant plenary
power impulse in federal Indian law involves another, even more radical,
kind of bootstrapping. At least the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
empowers federal courts to interfere with the police power of the states only
concerning matters of economic regulation, a subject on which the
Constitution expressly grants legislative authority to Congress when
338. See Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 125,
139-40.
339. The other major precedents might also be explained as applications of the inquiry
whether tribal regulation unduly burdens nonmembers who are not situated similarly to members.
Merrion suggests that, when nonmembers have the capacity ex ante to negotiate with tribes, the
federal courts should not supplement the bargain by adding common-law immunities to tribal
authority. In contrast, where, as in Montana and Brendale, nonmember fee owners have no
convenient way to negotiate ex ante with tribes, common-law immunities to tribal regulation may
seem more appropriate. In addition, the power to tax at issue in Merrion, as it implicates the very
capacity of a government to survive, may have been viewed as a stronger local justification for
tribal authority than the power to regulate hunting and fishing (Montana) and to zone (Brendale)
within the reservation.
The tribal-court civil jurisdiction cases remain somewhat inscrutable under this analysis.
however. Perhaps the nonmember store owner in Williams could have protected himself ex ante,
so that his failure to find some way to avoid tribal court for his collection actions required no
judicial solicitude. National Farmers and Iowa Mutual may reflect a special judicial deference to
other tribunals, but Strate indicates that this trend may have ended, at least for cases arising on
nonmember land. The most recent decision, El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie. 119 S. Ct.
1430 (1999), suggests that tribal courts retain presumptive civil jurisdiction over nonmembers on
Indian land. See supra note 277.
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interstate concerns are present. Moreover, so long as state economic
regulation is facially neutral and not motivated by self-serving purposes, a
presumption of validity attaches to it. The dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine is arguably consistent with the intentions of the constitutional
Framers and does promote national free trade, a value around which there is
almost uniform consensus. Contrast the dormant plenary power impulse.
Even though the Court today understands congressional authority to be
rooted in the Indian Commerce Clause, long ago the Court accorded
Congress plenary power over all Indian affairs, commercial or otherwise.
Because congressional power over Indian affairs is plenary, the front-line
judicial power to invalidate tribal regulation lacks clearly defined limits as
well. Moreover, the opinions do not aggregate into any presumption
favoring the validity of tribal regulation of nonmembers so long as such
regulation is facially neutral and seems free of improper motivation.
In establishing the plenary power of Congress over Indian affairs, the
Court performed the perhaps disappointing, but nonetheless unsurprising,
role of the "court of the conqueror" reflected in Johnson v. McIntosh:' It
deferred to established patterns and practices designed to centralize the
colonial power in the political branches. When it, in effect, arrogated to
itself what amounts to a judicially enforceable "dormant" aspect of this
power, however, the Court became an actor imposing its own set of colonial
values, not merely an agent of congressional choices. This second step
seems remarkable, even given the realities of a colonial society. The Court
has transformed itself from the court of the conqueror into the court as the
conqueror.
C. Harmonizing Federal Indian Law with the Anglo-American
Legal Landscape
The basic thrust of the Court's statutory interpretation and quasi-
constitutional decisions in federal Indian law has been to domesticate tribal
power by harmonizing federal Indian law with basic Anglo-American legal
values and assumptions. The Court has produced a profound "flattening"
of federal Indian law into the broader public law. The precedents and the
canons of interpretation that have rendered the field of Indian law a unique
exception to many general public-law principles have now been diluted in
the name of legal uniformity and the protection of the perceived reasonable
reliance of nonmembers upon their assumptions about the rule of law and
the roles of lawmaking institutions within the United States.
This judicial missionary work of bringing the general law into Indian
country may explain at least some of the Indian law precedents that are not
340. See supra note 188.
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simply rooted in statutory interpretation or quasi-constitutional elaboration.
The clearest example is Strate. Recall that the case involved a suit brought
in tribal court by a nonmember surviving spouse of a member decedent and
by his member children against a nonmember concerning an auto accident
on a state highway. These facts might seem analogous to the common
situation in which a citizen brings suit in her home state's court against a
citizen of another state. One of the most basic elements of civil procedure is
that this scenario raises fears that the defendant will be unfamiliar with
local processes or will be "hometowned" by the local judge or jury.
Accordingly, in its wisdom, Congress enacted legislation allowing the out-
of-state defendant to remove the case to federal court.34' But, it would seem,
the Court in Strate concluded that Congress lacked infinite wisdom, for it
has never enacted legislation allowing nonmember defendants to remove
cases from tribal court to federal or state court. Overtly analogizing to
removal from state courts,4 the Court simply filled the gap in federal law
by adopting a federal common-law approach precluding tribal-court
authority on the facts of Strate, thereby compelling similarly situated
plaintiffs, in the absence of diversity of citizenship and an amount in
controversy authorizing federal jurisdiction, to bring the case in state
court.
343
On the surface, Strate may seem defensible as similar to other decisions
that borrow statutorily rooted policies to inform federal common-law
evolution. Perhaps the most famous of these is Moragne v. States Marine
Lines," in which the Supreme Court abandoned the common-law rule
barring recovery for wrongful death in light of the repudiation of that
approach in numerous federal and state wrongful death statutes. Few would
quarrel with the general logic of Moragne that "legislative establishment of
policy carries significance beyond the particular scope of each of the
statutes involved. The policy thus established has become itself a part of
our law, to be given its appropriate weight not only in matters of statutory
construction but also in those of decisional law." 3" Now that federal Indian
341. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994).
342. See Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 n.13 (1997).
343. The Court implicitly referred to forum-shopping concerns by noting that the protective
action already filed by plaintiffs was in a state court that is "open to all who sustain injuries on
North Dakota's highway," id. at 459, and that is "physically much closer by road to the accident
scene... than [is] the tribal courthouse," id. at 445 n.4 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 8 n.6).
344. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
345. Id. at 390-91. On the theory that courts should reason by analogy from statutes that do
not govern the litigative dispute but express a clear legislative policy strongly counseling the
evolution of the common law, see James McCauley Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in
HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213 (1934); Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV.
L. REV. 383 (1908); and Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L.
REV. 4 (1936). For an excellent student note on the theory that was written soon after Moragne.
see Michael J. Bean, Note, The Legitimacy of Civil Law Reasoning in the Common Law: Justice
Harlan's Contribution, 82 YALE L.J. 258 (1972).
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law is being folded into the general public law at an unprecedented rate, we
might expect to see more Moragne-like reasoning importing principles
from the "general law" 4 in an effort to make the field less arcane-to
domesticate it as a branch of general federal public law rather than to allow
it to retain its complicated conglomeration of unique doctrines.
The potential consequences of this technique for federal Indian law
would be hard to overstate. They easily transcend those of the Court's more
established approaches-loose statutory interpretation and quasi-
constitutional lawmaking-to accommodating nonmember interests. For, if
broadly implemented, the Moragne technique could well mean the end of
the field of federal Indian law as we have known it. This is so because,
unlike loose statutory interpretation and quasi-constitutional lawmaking,
which are at least both tied to presumptions about congressional purposes,
moving Moragne into Indian law would suggest that the many aspects of
federal Indian law that are in tension with general public-law principles
should be judicially waved aside in the name of harmonization. Judges
could then look to any source of general American legal principles-
statutes, administrative regulations, state as well as federal common law-
and when, as will often be the case, an inconsistency appears, displace the
established unique aspect of Indian law in the name of legal uniformity, all
without any specific congressional guidance.
The Moragne method has influenced doctrinal evolution in such basic
domains as torts and landlord-tenant relations, where certain aspects of the
ubiquitous backdrop of the common law have been statutorily modified so
consistently that it is clear that a more appropriate policy has been
legislatively identified. 7 Despite these important inroads, however, the
method is probably generally unfamiliar to American-trained lawyers, who
may assume that a statute can intrude into a common-law domain only
when its terms govern the case.4 In my judgment, this traditional
assumption does take a crabbed view of the capacity of legislatures to
articulate reasoned principles counseling legal evolution.4 9 That the
Moragne move is a legitimate tool for the reassessment of hoary doctrines
in basic common-law fields in no way counsels the automatic use of the
technique to flatten all unique legal regimes into more general patterns,
however. Indeed, "[a] possible danger... is that the very unfamiliarity of
the doctrine will give it an immediate superficial attractiveness. Initially
346. See Moragne, 398 U.S. at 391-92 (" Today we should be thinking of the death statutes as
part of the general law." (quoting Roscoe Pound, Conunent on State Death Statutes-Application
to Death in Admiralty, 13 NACCA L.J. 188, 189 (1954))).
347. See Robert F. Williams, Statutes as Sources of Law Beyond Their Terms in Common-
Law Cases, 50 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 554, 571-73, 583 n.160 (1982).
348. See id. at 557-58; Bean, supra note 345, at 258-59.
349. See ESKRIDGE & FRicKEY, supra note 292, at 398-411 (examining case law and
commentary on statutes as sources of law beyond their terms).
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grasped, the methodology seems capable of giving almost any solution
desired for a particular problem." 350
In particular, where the courts have adopted special approaches to
construct fine-tuned "interpretive regimes,"'35' there has been a judicial
understanding that the legal domain in question has unique qualities
legitimately distinguishing it from the "general law." An obvious example
is criminal regulation: Statutory codes have displaced the common law of
crimes, and those criminal statutes are construed narrowly so that the
citizenry has fair notice of what conduct triggers sanctions.352 In such areas
of law, special considerations counsel that doctrinal evolution generally
requires direct legislative intervention, not common-law evolution.
Federal Indian law is best understood as one of these domains. It
represents a structural, sovereign-to-sovereign arrangement that seeks to
meld historical practices of colonization with a current commitment to
tribal survival. Federal Indian law came first. It legitimated for non-Indian
purposes the colonial processes used in the acquisition of Indian lands and
the displacement and involuntary partial incorporation of indigenous
peoples. It thereby made room-both literally and figuratively-for the
construction of the general American legal system, which continues to sit
awkwardly on top of internal tribal law and the federal-tribal relationship.
Given this background and its contemporary consequences, an interpretive
regime requiring clear congressional action to displace tribal prerogatives
further draws force from precedent and principle alike.353 It follows that
using the Moragne move to harmonize federal Indian law with the general
American law would be judicial colonization of the first order.3"
If increasing the clarity and predictability of federal Indian law is a
prime impetus for this technique, it is also likely to be unavailing. 355 For
350. Bean, supra note 345, at 279.
351. William Eskridge & John Ferejohn, Politics, Interpretation. and the Rule of Law. in
NOMOS XXXVI: THE RULE OF LAW 265, 267 (1994).
352. On the narrow construction of criminal statutes, see, for example, Dan M. Kahan, Lenity
and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SuP. CT. REv. 345.
353. Thus, federal Indian law involves more than the allocation of lawmaking power between
the federal courts and Congress-the most fundamental question is whether either federal
lawmaking entity has displaced underlying tribal authority. In this respect, Strate was a
considerably more controversial exercise of the Moragne move than was Moragne itself, because
there the Court may have been "influenced by the fact that it was dealing with an area of federal
admiralty law, and not with an area in which the effect of a change would be to preempt otherwise
applicable state law." David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67
N.Y.U. L. REv. 921, 953 (1992).
354. Cf Frickey, supra note 11, at 1764-65 (criticizing scholarship suggesting that general
equal protection theories should be imported into federal Indian law as making "an error of
significant magnitude, for it confuses a puzzling, conceptually intractable, and little-understood
corner of public law with its mainstream").
355. Indeed, even in the seemingly much simpler area of tort actions for wrongful death on
the waters, the judicial implementation of Moragne has proved surprisingly difficult and
controversial. See, e.g., Robert Force, The. Curse of Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.: The Mischief of
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example, in Brendale, Justice White, writing for a four-Justice bloc, argued
that the tribe had no sovereign authority to zone nonmember reservation
property, but did have a property interest in being free from usage of
nonmember property that imperiled the tribal interest in using its own land
as it reasonably saw fit.356 According to White, this federal property interest
might be enforceable only through the county zoning process and whatever
appeals or litigation might lie beyond it under state law.3$ Then again,
White seemed to indicate that the tribe might have a way to invoke federal-
court jurisdiction at some point to protect its property interestY5 In the final
analysis, the opinion stands as an example of analogical reasoning in an
endless loop, a descent into the maelstrom of judicial freewheeling that
leads everywhere in general but nowhere in particular. The confusion and
unpredictability are compounded by the fact that five Justices did not join
the White opinion, with two of them opting for an outcome based on the
Indian character of the area in question and three others arguing for the
traditional notion that tribal sovereignty to zone should be territorial in
scope.3 9 Brendale demonstrates that any judicial effort to undertake first-
line responsibility for bringing coherence to federal Indian law by
harmonizing it with the broader law may produce more, not less, of a
conceptual mess. There are too many choices and not enough judicial
consensus, even leaving aside the nagging question whether there is
sufficient justification to overrule the many longstanding precedents
recognizing unique tribal interests where Congress also has authority to
displace such settled law.
As a final example, recall Duro. The Moragne technique suggests that a
well-established statutory pattern of policy counsels reconsideration of an
inconsistent common-law rule. Yet in Duro, the Court adopted a new
constitutionally inspired common-law rule-that tribes had no criminal
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians-in the face of a pattern of federal
statutes suggesting that Congress had long assumed tribes had such
jurisdiction and that, far from promoting a coherent harmonization of
criminal jurisdiction in Indian country, produced a serious gap in it.' The
outcome in Duro starkly demonstrates that the three judicial techniques that
have emerged in federal Indian law during the past two decades are not
Seeking "Uniformity" and "Legislative Intent" in Maritime Personal Injury Cases. 55 LA. L.
REV. 745 (1995) (discussing cases following Moragne).
356. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Nation. 492 U.S. 408. 430-
31 (1989) (White, J., joined by Rehnquist, CJ., and Scalia & Kennedy. JJ.)
357. Seeid at 431.
358. See id.
359. See supra text accompanying notes 122-230.
360. See supra note 211 (explaining the jurisdictional void concerning minor crimes
committed by nonmember Indians against tribal members that resulted from Duro).
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always compatible. Taken together, these techniques may well promise
more, not less, incoherence in federal Indian law.
D. The Consequences of Doing What Comes Naturally: Anglocentric
Analogical Reasoning
Analogical reasoning is a key judicial tool. 361 In an area as murky as
federal Indian law, analogizing to more mainstream areas of law may be
almost irresistible, especially for judges who have not developed any
appreciation for why federal Indian law has grown up to be as unusual as it
is. 3 62 The Court's jurisprudence on tribal authority over nonmembers is
saturated with analogical reasoning. Unfortunately, the Court's analogical
exercises seem more ad hoc than adept, more Anglocentric than analytical.
In the diminishment cases, the Court seems to have jettisoned the
canonical approach to the interpretation of statutes and treaties in favor of a
fact-based analogical process. The basic inquiry is whether the reservation
area in question is, in the Justices' minds, analogous to off-reservation
areas. To put it bluntly, the Court seems to be asking, "is this area like the
rest of South Dakota, or is it truly Indian in nature?" One might question
the objectivity of this analysis from a group of jurists who may know little
about South Dakota, much less about Indian reservations found there.
Whatever vision is conjured up of a truly "Indian reservation" may have
little to do with contemporary reality and imposes an essentialist, static
conception upon the inherently dynamic institutions of tribal governance
and contexts of tribal life.
In Oliphant and its progeny, the Court has embarked upon a process of
bringing the values of the broader legal system to Indian country. The
Constitution does not apply to tribal governmental action, and Congress has
imposed only a qualified set of analogous limitations upon tribes in the
Indian Civil Rights Act. Nonetheless, the Court has "improved" upon the
congressional solution by diminishing tribal power when it threatens the
judicial conception of fundamental rights untouched by ICRA, such as the
threat that all-member juries might treat nonmembers unfairly. In these
situations, the Court seems to view tribal processes as analogous to those of
state and local governments, rather than as a different sort of sovereignty-
one that predates the Constitution, possesses inherent, retained indigenous
authority rather than constitutionally rooted reserved or delegated power,
361. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REv. 741 (1993).
362. Even scholars who are sympathetic to tribes have made this mistake, by explaining the
canons of interpretation in federal Indian law as an application of a principle favoring discrete and
insular racial minorities, when the appropriate justification for the canons is that they reflect the
sovereign-sovereign relationship of tribes with the United States. See Frickey, supra note 22, at
424-26.
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and is subject to "Anglocization" (colonial assimilative impositions)
through the congressional rather than the judicial process. Even more
remarkably, Strate suggests that seemingly foundational subconstitutional
values, such as the availability of removal from potentially biased local
courts, are also fair game for analogical implementation despite the fact that
Congress has never seen fit to impose them upon the tribes.
It should be obvious that bringing the Constitution to Indian country
and promoting evolution of the federal common law of Indian affairs to
harmonize it with our general law are radical steps that could disintegrate
the established doctrines of federal Indian law. It is ironic, indeed, in a field
in which the Court says that Congress has plenary power, that this
destructive drive toward uniformity has taken place without any supporting
congressional action. Indeed, the only recent congressional lawmaking
directly involving the concerns of this Article-the legislation overturning
Duro by acknowledging tribal authority to prosecute nonmember Indians-
was motivated solely by a desire to undo a Supreme Court decision
designed to make federal Indian law more uniform. It is ironic, as well, that
this judicial shift has occurred in a time in which the express congressional
and executive policy has been to promote, not undercut, tribal sovereignty.
Nor has the Court openly acknowledged that it has gone a long way
toward abandoning its prior practices of using canons of interpretation to
prevent all but congressionally mandated losses of tribal interests. In the
reservation-diminishment cases and the implicit-divestiture cases like
Bourland, where the Court purported to rely upon statutory or treaty text, it
is hard to avoid the conclusion that the Court paid the canons lip service,
but ended up embracing its sense of general congressional assimilative
purposes where the context under litigation was seen as heavily non-Indian
in nature. But note that the general congressional purposes in these cases
relate to statutes adopted long ago, during a different era in federal-tribal
relations, and represent obsolete congressional purposes as against current
congressional and executive policies. Why should the Court prefer old
purposes to new ones, especially where, as in all these cases, the statutory
text does not compel any particular outcome and the canons favoring the
protection of Indian interests have both a longstanding pedigree and a
substantial basis in policy?
In the implicit-divestiture cases like Oliphant and Duro, where the
Court has fallen victim to a "dormant plenary power impulse" to bring
constitutional values to Indian country, the canons have played an even less
significant role. The Court in these circumstances imposed such federal
common-law rules where Congress has been essentially silent (Oliphant)
and even where Congress has sent strong signals contrary to the judicial
outcome (Duro). To the extent that the Court has considered
nonconstitutional values as informing its authority to alter federal common
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law in this domain, as occurred in Strate, it has arrogated to itself even
more power than was involved in Oliphant or Duro, for the Court seems to
believe that all values found in general law, not just well-established
constitutional values, are relevant to the new harmonization of federal
Indian law. To put it bluntly, this approach suggests that, to the extent that
federal Indian law is inconsistent with what law students learn in their
required courses and foundational electives, federal Indian law is out of step
and in need of reform. The current congressional and executive policies
promoting tribal self-government are, apparently, irrelevant to this inquiry,
except to the extent that they suggest to the Court that tribes have allies
available who might be willing to overturn the Court once in a while and
restore to tribes some authority that was judicially removed, as with the
legislation effectively overruling Duro.
This technique turns federal Indian law on its head. The field is best
understood as reflecting a stark compromise between colonialism
(overriding power) and limited government (the rule of law): Congress has
virtually untethered authority over Indian affairs, but the courts stand ready,
through the canons of interpretation, to force Congress to do its ongoing
colonial work expressly.363 The vagaries of existing law are interpreted to
preserve tribal sovereignty, and those seeking to diminish tribal power must
bear the burden of overcoming legislative inertia to obtain express
congressional authorization. This approach provides the courts with a
course to chart through the immense complexities of the field, preserves the
status quo from the Indian perspective, and gives tribes and their allies fair
notice and a meaningful chance to defeat proposals to implement
colonization more broadly. The new harmonization threatens to jettison this
well-established mediating method rooted in congressional responsibility
and judicial checks in favor of a one-sided imposition of colonial values
where courts, not Congress, assume front-line colonial responsibility.
If the judges borrow concepts from the general law, not simply from
constitutional values and general congressional purposes associated with
particular statutes, the uniqueness of federal Indian law may evaporate. In a
decade or two, law schools may have no reason to offer a course in
"Federal Indian Law"; instead, it might be enough to teach a chapter called
"Indian Lands" in a casebook on public lands and natural resources. Tribes
will have lost all sovereignty and, from the outside, might appear to be little
more than ethnocentric Elks Clubs. To be sure, tribes and their members
will endure as best they can. But even if the doctrinal drift alone is unlikely
363. See Frickey, supra note 22, at 406-17.
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to revive the nineteenth-century non-Indian notion of the "vanishing
Indian," 364 it is the harbinger of the vanishing Indian law.
Of course, nothing like a complete collapse of federal Indian law into
the broader public law has yet occurred. What I have described is merely a
trend that the Court itself has embarked upon without evident reflection.
Particularly in a field as slippery and complicated as federal Indian law, a
host of choices remains viable. In the next Part, this Article concludes by
briefly examining some of them.
VI. CONCLUSION: SOME ALTERNATIVES TO THE NEW HARMONIZATION OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
The end of a lengthy article is hardly the place to examine with
requisite care the choices available to Congress and the Supreme Court in
this second quincentennial of the colonization of this continent. Instead,
what I hope to do is merely suggest some of the plausible avenues open to
these institutions in addressing what seems to be the root problem in the
cases involving judicial diminishment of tribal authority: the presence of
nonmembers in Indian country.
In many respects, the simplest option for the Court would be to freeze
the law as it now stands, embrace what it can retrieve of the traditional
concepts, and force Congress to undertake any further relief for
nonmembers in Indian country. This approach would leave the doctrines
incoherent-it would maintain precedents favoring tribal sovereignty like
Williams and Merrion, while likewise entrenching nonmember-protecting
precedents like Oliphant and Montana. Any real freezing of the doctrinal
status quo would have to avoid more decisions like Bourland and Strate,
which refused to find rather evident distinctions between their facts and
prior precedents.3" Such a judicial change of direction might seem unfair to
nonmembers, who have been able to convince courts of the injustice of
tribal regulation on a case-by-case basis. But a fundamental problem with
the Court's new common law of colonization is that it relieves Congress of
its responsibility to visit these issues. A further problem is that the disputes
come up in a concrete litigative situation in which an abstract and poorly
364. On this myth, see, for example, BRIAN W. DIPPIE, THE VANISHING AMERICAN: WHITE
ArTrTuDEs AND U.S. INDIAN POLICY (1982); and Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of
Conquest: A Vision Quest for a Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L REv. 77, 79-80
(1993).
365. The outcome in Bourland could easily have been avoided by interpreting Oliphant and
Duro as merely involving tribal criminal authority and Montana as merely involving tribal civil
regulatory authority over nonmember fee lands. These limiting interpretations would then have
freed the Court in Strate to consider National Farmers and Iowa Mutual as the authoritative
precedents concerning tribal-court jurisdiction over nonmember defendants, and to conclude that
Montana had no relevance there, because the conduct of the nonmember defendant in question
occurred outside nonmember fee land.
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understood concept with little cross-cultural currency-tribal sovereignty-
is weighed against perceived real hardship to an identified individual with
whom the judges share more cultural affinity. It is no surprise how that
balance has been struck in recent cases-that, to borrow from Holmes
again, it is tribal sovereignty, not the presence of nonmembers in Indian
country, that strikes judges as an "accidental relic of an early notion." But
the fundamental question is which institution should be attempting to strike
the balance in the first place. Under our longstanding assumptions in the
field, that institution should be Congress, not the Court.36 The only way
that Congress is likely to take on these matters is if the Court retrocedes to
it front-line responsibility for them.367
To divert the Court from its doctrinal drift, such considerations of
comparative institutional competence are probably paramount, but other
factors are also relevant. Most fundamentally, the Court is unlikely to take a
more favorable view of tribal sovereignty in the contemporary context
without being presented with a salient argument for following the
traditional constructs of the Marshall Court that transcends a mere
exhortation to adhere to the formalisms of hoary precedent.368 At bottom,
the Court needs a contemporary comfort level with the proposition that
tribes are governments, not voluntary membership associations; it is surely
discomfort with this conclusion that has led the Court to impose a creeping
constitutionalism in federal Indian law. There is no escaping the normative
character of any defense of tribal sovereignty along these lines,369 although
practical factors, such as scholarship indicating that economic development
in Indian country works best when tribes are capable of autonomous
sovereignty, make the case as well.
37 °
366. See Getches, supra note 22, at 1573-76.
367. Cf Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians. 119 S. Ct. 1187 (1999)
(declining to construe a treaty or an executive order as abolishing tribal off-reservation hunting,
fishing, and gathering rights); Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Techs., 118 S. Ct. 1700, 1705 (1998)
(refusing to abolish tribal sovereign immunity by judicial decision, and instead leaving the issue
for Congress).
368. See Frickey, supra note 68, at 1204-09.
369. In earlier work, I have attempted to make the case that, at a minimum, the opponents of
tribal sovereignty bear the burden of argumentative persuasion today. A major piece of the
defense of a baseline of tribal authority is based on a conceptualization of the Marshall Court
precedents as attempts to mediate colonialism and constitutionalism rather than simply to
privilege the former. See Frickey, supra note 22; supra text accompanying notes 54-60. More
fundamentally, I have suggested that our traditions of limited government, consent of the
governed, and respect for autonomy are simply incompatible with our historical and contemporary
unilateral displacement of indigenous persons. Today, the international community almost
universally condemns future acts of colonization. The failure of policies such as allotment
demonstrates that practical concerns support the autonomy of tribes as well. See Frickey, supra
note 23, at 48 & n.71.
370. See Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Reloading the Dice: Improving the Chances for
Economic Development on American Indian Reservations, in WHAT CAN TRIBES Do'?
STRATEGIES AND INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Stephen
Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt eds., 1995).
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What might Congress do in response to the agonizing problems faced
both by tribes and nonmembers, as well as by states that have potentially
overlapping jurisdiction with tribes? No doubt tribal leaders would do their
best to prevent Congress from further diluting tribal sovereignty, and no
one should begrudge them that effort. If Congress is bestirred to attempt to
achieve a principled compromise, however, it should encourage a wide
scope to the imagination of good-faith advocates for all sides. Consider a
few possibilities, which I offer merely as illustrations of places where such
a conversation might begin.
If Congress deemed tribal courts to be inferior institutions to adjudicate
claims against nonmembers, it might consider increasing federal funding
and other supportive measures for these courts. Perhaps the quid pro quo
could be a limited federal appellate review, akin to certiorari, from the
highest tribal court to the Supreme Court, to the federal court of appeals for
that circuit, or to a special Court of Appeals for Indian Affairs.3 '
Another possibility would be the enactment of an "Unallotment Act."
Bruce Duthu once imagined such a federal statute that would provide that,
after the passage of a certain amount of time, perhaps a decade, all
nonmembers who remain in Indian country would be subject to full tribal
territorial sovereignty.372 Duthu acknowledged the political implausibility of
the proposal,373 but there may be more politically feasible revisions to the
idea. For example, Congress might provide the tribe with a right of first
refusal concerning any transfer of fee simple land within the reservation, so
that the tribe would have the privilege of purchase. Of course, for most
tribes, funds are not readily available for such an effort, and thus Congress
would have to provide financial assistance. A more aggressive program
would recognize a tribal power of eminent domain concerning fee simple
reservation land.374 As a matter of compromise, Congress could limit such
371. See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, 26 WiLLAMErrE L
REV. 841, 889-94 (1990) (exploring, but not necessarily endorsing, such options). For the
argument that a dialogue between tribal courts and the state and federal courts would more
productively advance fair and efficient adjudication respectful of tribal sovereignty than would
litigation in the federal courts about the capacities of tribal judiciaries, see BJ. Jones, Welcoming
Tribal Courts into the Judicial Fraternity: Emerging Issues in Tribal-State and Tribal-Federal
Court Relations, 24 WM. MrTCHELL L. REV. 457 (1998).
372. See N. Bruce Duthu, Implicit Divestiture of Tribal Powers: Locating Legitimate Sources
of Authority in Indian Country, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 353, 399-400 (1994). Duthu's article
presents a good overview of the implicit-divestiture cases as well as a realistic perspective upon
potential responses to them.
373. See id. at 400.
374. Authorizing the tribe to exercise a power of eminent domain would seem similar to
acknowledging tribal civil regulatory authority, which was upheld in Mazurie. See supra text
accompanying notes 154-157. If Congress may authorize eminent domain, it might very well have
the lessei-included power of authorizing a right of first refusal to the tribe. One important feature
of both of these proposals is that the nonmember landowner would receive fair market value for
the land. For one recent congressional proposal to promote land consolidation on reservations, see
H.R. 4325, 105th Cong. (1998).
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programs to reservations, or portions of reservations, where land
consolidation seems most feasible. Interestingly, such efforts may have a
significant chance of success on some Indian reservations today, which
because of depopulation trends by non-Indians have an increasingly
"Indian character." 
375
At bottom, the issues seem to be more about political economy than
law. Indeed, the Court itself has engaged in its own brand of amateur
political economy in recent years, evaluating demographics and land
ownership patterns in deciding whether reservation boundaries should be
diminished and whether tribal authority should remain over nonmembers
concededly found within the reservation. In light of the doctrinal confusion
and practical chaos that these lines of cases have produced, however, it
strikes me as fruitful to shift the intellectual debate in federal Indian law in
order to spark the imagination of professional political economists and to
dampen the influence of litigation.376 The only institution capable of
encouraging such innovation designed to find local solutions to local
problems is Congress-and to do so it would itself need to avoid one-size-
fits-all statutory solutions and instead provide incentives for the play of
imagination and bargaining.
Of course, many other legislative possibilities exist, including some that
would seriously intrude upon or even terminate tribal sovereignty.
3 77
375. See BORDEWICH, supra note 6, at 342 (referring to the Great Plains as a "region for the
most part so ill-suited to modern development that the descendants of the settlers who muscled the
Indians off in the nineteenth century have largely abandoned it themselves").
376. See Frickey, supra note 11, at 1777-84.
377. One obvious example would be the granting of some sort of voting rights to
nonmembers. This solution might make sense on some reservations, but I would hope that it
would be accomplished by voluntary compromise by the tribe, not through unilateral
congressional action. Related strategies might include allowing nonmembers to serve on juries
and constructing approaches to shared governance for limited-purpose institutions. For discussion
of one such innovative arrangement, see Utah Department of Community and Economic
Development, 1997 Annual Report- Uintah Basin Revitalization Fund (visited Mar. 16, 1999)
<http:llwww.ce.ex.state.ut.us/annrep97/ubrf.html>, which describes a five-member board-
consisting of a governor's designee, one county commissioner each from the two affected
counties, and two representatives of the Ute Indian Tribe's Business Committee-that distributes
revenue from the state severance tax imposed upon the extraction of minerals on tribal trust lands
in grants to agencies of county or tribal government working to benefit those who are socially or
economically affected by this oil and gas development. For an overview of an innovative bilateral
agreement concerning shared governance by the federal government and a tribe, see Charles
Wilkinson, The Role of Bilateralism in Fulfilling the Federal-Tribal Relationship: The Tribal
Rights-Endangered Species Secretarial Order, 72 WASH. L. REV. 1063 (1997): and Carl H.
Johnson, Note, Balancing Species Protection with Tribal Sovereignty: What Does the Tribal
Rights-Endangered Species Order Accomplish?, 83 MINN. L. REv. 523 (1998). On jurisdictional
agreements between states and tribes, see, for example, P.S. Deloria & Robert Laurence.
Negotiating Tribal-State Full Faith and Credit Agreements: The Topology of the Negotiation and
the Merits of the Question, 28 GA. L. REV. 365, 373-74 (1994); David H. Getches, Negotiated
Sovereignty: Intergovernmental Agreements with American Indian Tribes as Models for
Expanding Self-Government, 1 REV. CONST. STUD. 120, 121 (1993); Rebecca Tsosie, Negotiating
Economic Survival: The Consent Principle and Tribal-State Compacts Under the Indian Gaming
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Colonialism is a dangerous political game, and congressional
considerations of these problems could go in a variety of directions, some
of them devastating to tribes. In anticipation of such possibilities, there are
those of us in the academy who would provide some judicially enforceable
side constraints upon unilateral congressional colonial action.3 7' For present
purposes, however, it seems sufficient to note what the examination of
Supreme Court decisions in this Article has demonstrated: that any effort to
mediate the tension between tribes and nonmembers in Indian country is
inherently political and not easily subject to judicial balancing and
resolution. Dialogue and compromise among sovereigns--Congress, tribes,
and states, which have incentives to provide an effective voice to
nonmembers-are likely to be superior methods of achieving anything
remotely approaching a lasting solution in this context of multi-sided and
sharply contrasting visions of "accidental relics of early notions" and "felt
necessities of the time." What makes sense is a constructive conversation,
not a common law, for our age of colonialism.
Regulatory Act, 29 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 25, 59 (1997); and Note, Intergovernmental Compacts in Native
American Lav: Models for Expanded Usage, 112 HARV. L. REv. 922 (1999).
378. For my argument, see Frickey, supra note 23.
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